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Criminally Disproportionate 
Warfare: Aggression As A 
Contextual War Crime 
Rachel E. VanLandingham* 
International law has long recognized the general principle 
that an illegal act cannot produce legal rights. Yet, this principle 
of ex injuria jus non oritur is seemingly ignored in the uneasy 
relationship between the two international legal regimes most 
associated with war. A head of State can, for example, violate 
international law regulating the resort to armed force by 
ordering his military forces to illegally invade another country, 
yet he, through his military forces, simultaneously and 
subsequently benefits on the battlefield from the application of 
the separate body of international law regulating the actual 
conduct of war. The paradoxical benefit flows from the latter 
regime’s salutary rules that allow for both the killing of opposing 
military forces, and for the incidental death of civilians and 
destruction of civilian property during hostilities, even if the war 
is illegally triggered. 
Yet, the ex injuria jus non oritur principle is not 
completely jettisoned by this divorced operation of related legal 
regimes; the once-controversial crime against peace developed at 
Nuremberg has blossomed into the modern international crime 
of aggression, thus in theory condemning such a head of State 
under international criminal law for his role in launching an 
illegal invasion, thereby limiting his illegal gains. However, the 
prosecution of a head of State for the crime of aggression 
remains chimerical, at least for the time being, as the 
international community moves in fits and starts to enforce 
international law in the criminal arena.  
While the crime of aggression has not been prosecuted 
since its predecessor was controversially developed and 
implemented at Nuremberg, the international community has 
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since witnessed numerous international prosecutions of war 
crimes—violations of international laws governing the 
battlefield. This Article explores whether the crime of aggression 
can be prosecuted as a war crime by exposing the intersection of 
war’s two legal regimes within the war crime of disproportionate 
attack. It concludes that, exclusively for those State leaders 
responsible for crimes of aggression, the resultant collateral 
damage caused by such aggression—the civilian deaths and 
property destruction otherwise allowed by the international laws 
governing warfare—could be considered criminally excessive by 
building upon the contextual approach inherent in both bodies of 
law. Such an approach resides at the outer edges of the lex lata, 
but is one that normatively resonates with both common sense 
and the dictates of humanity. 
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Introduction 
One of the paradoxes of international law is the fact that not all 
acts of death and destruction committed in the course of pursuing an 
illegal war are illegal, never mind criminal. For example, if one 
assumes that Saddam Hussein violated jus ad bellum1 when he led 
 
1. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellum, 27 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L.  22, 23 (2009) (describing jus ad bellum as a changing versus 
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Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1991, that assumption does not legally taint 
the battlefield killing and property destruction necessary to carry out 
the invasion. Simply put, the illegality of Iraq’s armed invasion, or 
aggressive war, did not itself make the violent acts taken to carry out 
that conflict either illegal or criminal:  illegal wars can be legally 
fought.2 
This counter-intuitive result stems directly from the intentional 
bifurcation of jus ad bellum from jus in bello: there is a wall between 
the international legal framework regulating States’ resort to war and 
that governing the actual conduct of war.3 As this Article describes, 
the separate operation of these legal regimes is teleological and 
pragmatic in nature, linked to both the distinct purposes of the two 
frameworks as well as their histories. Fundamentally, the wall 
dividing these legal realms stems from jus in bello’s humanitarian 
impulses. Because it aims to lessen the suffering associated with war, 
the scope of jus in bello, or international humanitarian law (IHL), is 
pragmatically designed to be as wide as possible, equally applying to 
all parties in a conflict regardless of the legality of their cause.4  
This equal application of jus in bello to those on both sides of an 
armed conflict, aggressor and victim, seems to offend the legal precept 
of ex injuria jus non oritur:  that legal rights cannot be acquired by 
an illegal act.5 Despite Iraq’s illegal invasion of Kuwait, its armed 
 
static set of international rules that regulate the resort to war by 
States).  
2. See CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL 
BASIS, IN THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 10, 
§101 para. 7, at 10 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) (emphasizing the 
“illogical” axiom that “the rules of international humanitarian law apply 
with equal force to both sides in the conflict, irrespective of who is the 
aggressor”). 
3. NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 6 (2010) (describing the relevant legal frameworks); see also 
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 1, 3 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES] (describing international 
humanitarian law as jus in bello, regulating the conduct of hostilities 
and noting that “[t]he law of war in its totality is subdivided into the 
jus in bello (LOIAC) and the jus ad bellum (governing the legality of 
war)”). Jus in bello also provides protections for victims of war. See 
generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, para. 75 (July 8) (describing the merger of the Hague and Geneva 
law) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory]. 
4. See infra Part I.A. 
5. See generally Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the 
Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 206, 212 (1953) (applying this 
principle to aggressor States implies that an aggressor State should not 
benefit from jus in bello).  
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forces benefited from belligerent rights found in jus in bello during the 
conduct of that invasion; jus in bello tolerates incidental civilian death 
and destruction if proportionate to the military ends.6 While one can 
argue that Iraqi forces did not actually acquire jus in bello privileges 
from the invasion—that they were, instead, technically acquired 
through the application of positive law which created jus in bello’s 
privileges and strictures—the practical effect is the same.7 By 
triggering an armed conflict through a violation of jus ad bellum, an 
aggressor such as Hussein also triggers international humanitarian law 
that provides rights to, as well as imposes obligations on, his armed 
forces equal to that of the victim’s belligerent forces, seemingly in 
violation of ex injuria jus non oritur.  
International criminal law partially rectifies this apparent 
injustice by criminalizing clear jus ad bellum violations. The 
international crime of aggression, codified in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, criminalizes manifest violations of jus 
ad bellum.8 Applied to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, such 
criminalization would theoretically result in the criminal conviction 
and punishment of Saddam Hussein and other national leaders 
responsible for the illegal invasion, without attaching criminality to 
Iraqi soldiers’ individual acts on the battlefield. The soldiers’ acts of 
warfare, as long as conducted in accordance with jus in bello, would 
remain immune from prosecution despite their context of supporting a 
criminal war of aggression. This is international law’s incentive 
structure, one designed to limit the effects of war by shielding from 
criminal prosecution acts of warfare as long as jus in bello rules are 
followed.9  
 
6. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism 
of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 
YALE J. OF INT’L L. 47, 52-53 (2008) (explaining that while in bello 
proportionality tries to limit needless suffering in war, harm to civilians 
is anticipated with use of force).  
7. See Francois Bugnion, Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and International 
Humanitarian Law, 2 INT’L STUD. J. 39, 48 (2005) (characterizing the 
maxim of ex injuria jus non oritur as “irrelevant” in situations of 
aggressive war, arguing that the rights found in jus in bello flow not 
from the fact of war itself but from the conventions governing such a 
war).  
8. See infra Part II; see also The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, art. 8bis, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into 
force July 1, 2002), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/RomeStatutEng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NK5E-Y74R] [hereinafter Rome Statute].   
9. Cf. David Rodin, Two Emerging Issues of the Jus Post Bellum: War 
Termination and the Liability of Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, in 
JUS POST-BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM 
CONFLICT TO PEACE 53, 62 (C. Stahn & J.K. Kleffner eds., 2008) 
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Prosecuting the crime of aggression, in theory, provides individual 
criminal accountability for the senior leaders of government for 
starting and conducting wars of aggression, thereby furthering 
international criminal law’s goals of deterrence and retribution. 
Concurrently, the jus in bello separation from jus ad bellum, instead 
of allowing a criminal to, in a sense, gain from their criminal acts, 
mitigates the suffering experienced by the victims of the crime of 
aggression through jus in bello’s set of rules governing warfare.10 Yet, 
since Nuremberg’s controversial development and implementation of 
the crime of aggression’s predecessor, the crime against peace, there 
have been no criminal prosecutions for the crime of aggression, and it 
is unclear when such a prosecution may occur.11 Hence, the equal 
application of jus in bello to both aggressor and victim forces appears 
particularly jarring, immunizing the Hussein-type aggressors from 
criminal accountability for their war’s resultant death and 
destruction. 
However, international criminal tribunals have the increasing 
capacity and will to judge individual soldiers and statesmen regarding 
war crimes, that is, violations of jus in bello.12 This so-called 
“judicialization of armed conflict”13 is typified by the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals established by the United Nations 
 
(describing the immunity for fighting in an unjust war currently enjoyed 
by soldiers as the “liability gap”).  
10. Yet, it cannot be ignored that jus in bello, through its balance of 
military necessity with humanitarian desires, while reducing the 
suffering experienced by civilians and combatants in war, certainly does 
not eliminate it. But wars conducted under its rules are less horrific 
than those that are not. Hence, international law has chosen to 
immunize from criminal prosecution those soldiers who abide by its 
strictures. 
11. See generally Manuel J. Ventura and Matthew Gillett, The Fog of War: 
Prosecuting Illegal Uses of Force as Crimes Against Humanity, 12 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 522, 524 n. 2 (2013) [hereinafter 
Ventura & Gillet, The Fog of War] (“In short, the ICC is unlikely to try 
an aggression case in the foreseeable future.”). 
12. See JAMES GOW, WAR AND WAR CRIMES: THE MILITARY, LEGITIMACY, 
AND SUCCESS IN ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2013). By war crimes this Article 
refers to serious violations of international humanitarian law (the law of 
armed conflict, or jus in bello). See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, ET. AL, 
CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 65 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
CASSESE’S ICL]; Fausto Pocar, The Criminalization of The Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law from Nuremberg to the Rome Statute, 
in WAR CRIMES AND THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES  3 (Fausto Pocar et 
al. eds., 2013). 
13. Gow, supra note 12, at 5, citing Elspeth Guild, The Judicialisation of 
Armed Conflict: Transforming the Twenty-First Century, in THE 
POLITICS OF PROTECTION: SITES OF INSECURITY AND POLITICAL AGENCY 
122-35 (Jef Huysmans et. al., eds. 2006). 
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Security Council, for Yugoslavia (ICTY)14 and Rwanda (ICTR),15 the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),16 as well as by the 
international community’s sole permanent criminal court, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).17 To hold serious transgressors of 
jus in bello accountable for their actions, such courts have made great 
strides in translating the regulatory, operational rules found in 
international humanitarian law into criminal standards.18 
Despite these courts’ efforts, ambiguity remains regarding war 
crimes’ specific contours. Most relevant for this Article, the last few 
decades of international criminal prosecutions for war crimes reveal 
that jus ad bellum and jus in bello do not exist in hermetically sealed 
universes.19 The intersection of the two legal regimes—a junction this 
Article utilizes to potentially find criminal accountability for the 
crime of aggression—is reflected most often in debates regarding jus 
 
14. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
responsible for the Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. 
Res. 827, May 25, 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827 [hereinafter ICTY].  
15. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 
1994 and 31 December 1004, S.C. Res. 955, Nov. 8, 1994, UN Doc. 
S/RES/955 [hereinafter ICTR]. 
16. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, Aug. 14, 
2000,   http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WL7C-LLZN] (last visited July 21, 2015).  
17. See Beth Fain, The International Criminal Court: An Eminent Impact 
on A Hesitant United States, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004); see 
also Peggy E. Rancilio, From Nuremberg to Rome: Establishing an 
International Criminal Court and the Need for U.S. Participation, 77 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 155, 179-80 (1999). 
18. See generally Rogier Bartels, Dealing With The Principle of 
Proportionality In Armed Conflict In Retrospect: The Application of 
The Principle in International Criminal Trials, 46 ISR. L. REV. 271, 271 
(2013) (noting that jus in bello “has been significantly clarified and 
developed by international criminal tribunals and courts” (emphasis 
added)). 
19. The opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory case also reflects an acknowledged intersection 
between the two legal frameworks. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory, 
supra note 3, at 226; cf. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE 161-62 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, WAR] (describing 
the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory opinion as “enigmatic and vexing” 
and potentially an “extreme departure from the concept that the jus in 
bello applies equally to all belligerents, irrespective of…the jus ad 
bellum”); see generally Sloane, supra note 6, at 49 (describing the 
overlap between the two regimes). 
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in bello’s principle of proportionality, violations of which are 
criminalized through the crime of disproportionate attack.20 For 
example, critics of the ICTY prosecutor21 contended that operators of 
the NATO aerial bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999 should have 
been held to more restrictive legal standards regarding the foreseen 
but unintended civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property 
given the overall military campaign’s humanitarian raison d’être.22 
They also charged that the humanitarian motive behind the overall 
military campaign inappropriately relaxed interpretations and 
assessments of jus in bello, such as the calculus involved in the 
proportionality principle.23 In contrast, the independence of the two 
 
20. The jus in bello proportionality principle prohibits attacks “which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 51(5) 
[hereinafter AP I].  
21. See, e.g., Anne-Sophie Massa, Nato’s Intervention in Kosovo and the 
Decision of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion?, 24 BERKELEY INT’L L. 610, 618 (2006); cf. 
FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO 
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, ICTY Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E, June 13, 200, 
39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000), available at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10052#IVB3 [https://perma.cc/Y2FB-
N5YM][hereinafter FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR].   
22. See, e.g., Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and 
NATO Bombing in Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 531, 535 (2001) (suggesting 
a heightened proportionality targeting equation in humanitarian 
interventions); cf. Frederic Megret, Jus In Bello as Jus Ad Bellum, 100 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 121, 122 (2006) (describing a “tension between 
the rhetoric of a ‘humanitarian’ intervention and taking advantage of all 
the still rather permissive elasticity of the laws of war”). There were also 
those that charged that the humanitarian nature of NATO’s 
intervention caused the rules to be retroactively applied less rigorously. 
See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 6, at 96 (suggesting that the humanitarian 
impetus behind NATO’s intervention influenced the ex post facto 
assessments of proportionality by the ICTY prosecutor, loosening the 
rules and thereby legally allowing greater civilian casualties and damage 
to civilian property than what the standard was supposed to allow). 
23. This same dynamic was, per some scholars, also present earlier in the 
decade in the 1991 Gulf War, in which Iraq was forced out of Kuwait 
following Iraq’s illegal invasion:  jus ad bellum, it was maintained, 
inappropriately affected the interpretation of jus in bello proportionality, 
allowing greater civilian casualties because of the jus ad bellum propriety 
of the conflict itself. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force 
in International Law, 87 AM J. INT’L L. 391, 412 (1993) (“It seems 
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legal regimes has been underscored by at least one tribunal. The 
SCSL Appeals Chamber, in overturning a trial chamber decision to 
mitigate punishment for war crimes based on what it considered a 
worthy cause for the resort to force, emphasized that: 
[I]nternational humanitarian law specifically removes a party’s 
political motive and the “justness” of a party’s cause from 
consideration. The basic distinction and historical separation 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello underlies the desire of 
States to see that the protections afforded by jus in bello (i.e., 
international humanitarian law) are “fully applied in all 
circumstances to all persons who are protected by those 
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused 
by or attributed to the Parties to the conflicts.”24 
Despite this emphatic statement, there is at least one gray area in 
the current framework of jus in bello that reflects an overlap between 
the two legal regimes, one that could potentially be used to 
criminalize egregious jus ad bellum violations through a war crime 
prosecution. As background, scholars in the field of philosophical 
ethics are particularly consistent in their calls for changed conceptions 
of the dichotomy of the jus belli, specifically to delimit the contours of 
the jus in bello proportionality principle.25 Some argue, from a moral 
standpoint, that the military advantage that must be weighed against 
civilian casualties and damage within the proportionality standard 
derives its value from the war itself; hence, if jus ad bellum is not 
satisfied, the jus in bello military advantages are severely undermined, 
and vice versa.26 Per this reasoning, belligerents pursuing an 
 
unlikely that the international community would have tolerated the 
scale of civilian casualties in the conflict if it were not for the consensus 
that Iraq’s action had no legal or moral basis.”). 
24. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal 
Judgment, 529-31 (May 28, 2008) (describing the separation between jus 
in bello and jus ad bellum as a “bedrock principle” of the law of war). 
25. See e.g., Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 34 PHILOSOPHIA 
23, 23–41 (2006); see also Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the 
Morality of Warm 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 35 (2005) [hereinafter 
McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War]; cf. David Rodin, The Liability 
of Ordinary Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 591, 597 (2007) [hereinafter Rodin, Liability] (additionally 
providing a consequentialist argument for expanding proportionality to 
consider the war’s aims). 
26. See McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 25, at 29 (“One 
cannot evaluatively weigh the “mischief” caused by an act of war 
against the contribution the act would make to the probability of a 
mere event; one must also have some sense of the importance or value of 
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aggressive war contra jus ad bellum should not enjoy equal privileges 
in pursuing such improper ends.27 
Various legal scholars have made similar calls to incorporate jus 
ad bellum factors within the jus in bello proportionality analyses, 
particularly regarding asymmetric conflicts against non-state actors.28 
Some outline what they deem a “fuller” interpretation of 
proportionality that takes into account jus ad bellum propriety.29 
Others criticize what they deem as jus ad bellum assessments 
improperly entering the “backdoor” of jus in bello proportionality 
balancing equations when what appear to be jus ad bellum 
considerations of protection of the attacking State’s civilians are at 
play.30 While there is also debate regarding the impact of adherence to 
 
the event. If one’s cause is unjust, the value of the event – victory –
would presumably be negative, not positive.”). 
27. Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 541, 
547 (2009) (describing McMahan’s moral objections to the concept of 
equal application of jus in bello standards regardless of jus ad bellum 
considerations). 
28. Legal scholars have questioned the separation of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello in other contexts as well, such as at the intersection of the 
principles of military necessity and distinction and the propriety of 
killing belligerents based on their status as such. See, e.g., Gabriella 
Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 
115,128 (2010). 
29. See, e.g. Benvenisti, supra note 27 at 546 (describing a “fuller account 
of the jus in bello proportionality analysis” that takes into account “the 
legitimacy of the pursuit of the military goals”). See also Inger 
Osterdahl, Dangerous Liaison? The Disappearing Dichotomy between 
Jus ad Bellum and in Bello, 78 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 553-566, (2010) 
(outlining existing points of contact between the legal frameworks); see 
generally Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualising proportionality: jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese war, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
864 (2006) (suggesting that jus ad bellum consider jus in bello 
proportionality); see also Megret, supra note 22, at 122 (“how about 
asking more of States in terms of jus in bello in certain cases on the 
basis of their jus ad bellum motivation for going to war?”) 
30. Eliav Lieblich, Reflections on the Israeli Report on the Gaza Conflict, 
JUST SECURITY (June 24, 2015), 
http://justsecurity.org/24197/reflections-israeli-report-gaza-conflict/ 
[https://perma.cc/P52T-9Q6Z]. Additionally, similar to the above 
NATO example, States have also been criticized when deemed as 
importing jus ad bellum into jus in bello proportionality calculations; 
States have utilized so-called “just war logic” in conflicts against non-
state actors to inappropriately justify relaxed interpretations of jus in 
bello as well as to justify outright violations. See, e.g., Jasmine Moussa, 
Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of 
the two bodies of law, 872 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963, 964, 988 (2008) 
(describing the United States’ “war on terror” as one “in which self-
defense against the grave threat of terrorism has been invoked to justify 
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jus in bello on the propriety of a State’s jus ad bellum justifications,31 
this Article focuses on how the legality of an armed conflict or use of 
force under jus ad bellum affects jus in bello analyses, particularly 
regarding proportionality. Instead of calling for a definitive change in 
the laws regulating the battlefield, this Article proposes utilizing the 
already-opaque contours of the proportionality principle to criminalize 
the crime of aggression as a war crime. It highlights that there may 
be a jus ad bellum component already within the extant jus in bello 
proportionality principle, one derived from that principle’s contextual 
core. 
This Article assays the possibility of jus ad bellum factoring into 
the jus in bello war crime of disproportionate attack, exclusively for 
those individuals in leadership positions, such as Iraq’s Hussein who 
would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of aggression. Part I 
briefly sketches the modern contours of the distinction between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, highlighting the historical, teleological, and 
pragmatic factors behind their separation. This summary treatment is 
foundational for demonstrating that the two frameworks’ intersection, 
when assessing criminal liability for the war crime of disproportionate 
attack exclusively for those individuals who engage in the crime of 
aggression, aligns with both legal regimes’ purposes. Part II 
summarizes the development and need for criminalizing aggression, 
and provides an elemental overlay of violations of war crimes. This 
prosecutorial overlay could potentially be used as a tool for providing 
criminal accountability for those who commit the crime of aggression. 
Part III discusses a hypothetical prosecution of the crime of 
aggression as a war crime of disproportionate attack, finding it the 
most logical vehicle for addressing the crime of aggression within a 
war crime.   
In conclusion this Article notes that the international criminal 
prosecution of jus ad bellum criminal aggressors through the war 
crime of disproportionate attack may be criticized as violating the 
nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege principle; it is susceptible to 
criticisms similar to those lodged against Nuremberg’s crime against 
the peace.32 Necessary work remains to be done by States to 
appropriately evolve jus in bello to take into consideration the context 
of modern warfare, with its largely asymmetric nature and 
 
all kinds of excesses, while also implying that the terrorist, whose 
recourse to force is clearly illegal, is prevented from enjoying the 
protections of international humanitarian law”). 
31. See generally Robert D. Sloane, supra note 6, at 47; see also Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory, supra note 3, at 226. 
32. See generally CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 24-30 (outlining how the 
post-World War II international tribunals dealt with criticisms that the 
crime against peace was afoul of the principle of legality). 
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devastating effects on civilian populations. Such evolution is necessary 
if States are to remain faithful to the laws of humanity and their own 
professed allegiance to the dignity of all mankind. 
 
I. Jus Ad Bellum And Jus In Bello 
A.  Modern Contours 
The separate legal regimes of the jus belli operate primarily at 
different levels. At the macro level is the modern jus ad bellum, the 
international legal architecture delineating when and why States can 
lawfully use armed force against other States.33 Its modern centerpiece 
is the United Nations (UN) Charter, which prohibits the inter-state 
use of armed force except in limited cases of self-defense, or when 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council for purposes of 
collective security.34 This relatively sparse treaty legal regime, focused 
exclusively on inter-state armed violence, is informed by less clear 
customary international law.35 For example, the Charter’s exceptional 
lawful use of force in self-defense is supplemented by the customary 
 
33. See Greenwood, supra note 2. While the term itself refers expressly to 
war (bellum), jus ad bellum in recent years is typically used to refer to 
the legality of States’ use of armed force, regardless of whether such use 
rises to the level of what constitutes war, or armed conflict. See 
DINSTEIN, WAR supra note 19, at 85–91. 
34. “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. “Nothing 
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter, art. 51.  
35. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I. C. J. 14, para 34 (June 27) 
[hereinafter Nicaragua case] (“There can be no doubt that the issues of 
the use of force and collective self-defense…are regulated both by 
customary international law and by treaties, in particular the United 
Nations Charter.”); see also Ian Brownlie, International Law and the 
Use of Force by States Revisited, CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002) 
(hereinafter Brownlie, Revisited] (pointing to a “continuing role of 
customary international law relating to the use of force”); see generally 
Christine Gray, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 150 
(Malcolm Evans & Phoebe Okowa eds., 3d ed. 2008) (describing 
necessity and proportionality as key customary law components of the 
jus ad bellum). Customary international law regarding jus ad bellum also 
consists of issues such as what State actions constitute an armed attack. 
See eg DINSTEIN, WAR supra note 19, at 201 (explaining Nicaragua 
case’s attribution to customary international law of armed attack’s 
inclusion of sending of irregulars into another State’s territory). 
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principles of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy, based not on 
treaty language but rather on State practice and opinio juris.36  
In contrast to jus ad bellum’s concise international legal regime, 
intended to severely limit States’ resort to armed force, the micro 
level of war—how it is fought and the protections accorded to 
victims—is robustly regulated by international law via a plethora of 
treaty and customary provisions. Jus in bello, typically referred to 
today as international humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC),37 delimits the means and methods of war and provides 
treatment standards for those in opposing sides’ custody.38 Unlike the 
Charter jus ad bellum, which is concerned with the use of armed force 
among and between States,39 jus in bello regulates, in varying degrees, 
both inter and intra-state armed violence:  armed conflicts40 between 
and among States as well as civil wars, for example, within a State.41 
 
36. See generally Gray, supra note 35 at 147; see also DINSTEIN, WAR supra 
note 19, at 237-243 (outlining the substance of the customary principles 
of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy). The International Court 
of Justice has stated that proportionality and necessity are “rule[s] of 
customary international law.”  See Nuclear Weapons Advisory, supra 
note 3, at ¶ 41. 
37. This article uses these three terms (jus in bello, international 
humanitarian law (IHL), and the law of armed conflict) interchangeably 
and neutrally.  
38. Jus in bello also regulates the government of occupied territory, and 
some consider it to also include the law of neutrality; see GREENWOOD, 
supra note 2, at 13 (describing the law of neutrality as a “distinct 
branch of the laws of armed conflict” which regulates relations between 
States not party to a conflict and those who are).  
39. Cf. LUBELL, supra note 3, at 9 (finding that jus ad bellum is of “crucial 
concern” when States resort to armed force extraterritorially against 
non-state armed groups because another State’s territory is involved). 
40. Due to a desire to limit law avoidance by States trying to evade the 
application of jus in bello by not engaging in the formal activities 
required to trigger technical war designation, the Geneva Conventions 
utilize the term “armed conflict” to denote a de facto, objective 
condition of hostilities that triggers its legal rules.  See Int’l Comm. of 
the Red Cross, Commentary on the I Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field 49–50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-I.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GKK8-49J3] [hereinafter Commentary to Geneva 
Convention I]; see also Convention I for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]. 
41. See generally GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: 
AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 103, 35 (2012) [hereinafter CORN ET AL., 
AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH]; GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 22 (2010); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, 
at 3. 
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Its conventional sources include the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
their Additional Protocols of 1977, the 1907 Hague Regulations and 
other treaties.42 While the Geneva Conventions themselves have 
earned near-universal ratification, the other treaties have not.43 
Customary international law plays a huge role in both extending the 
reach of particular provisions of relevant treaties, as well as in 
developing and signaling their accepted meanings.44  
Developed as a result of different historical influences and at 
different times,45 these legal frameworks share related but distinct 
objectives: modern jus ad bellum aims to limit the use of armed force 
as a means of national policy by States, thereby limiting the 
frequency of war, in order to maintain stability of the “international 
social order.”46 International humanitarian law, in contrast, works to 
limit the actual suffering wrought by war: “its purpose is almost 
entirely humanitarian in the literal sense of the word . . . to rescue life 
from the savagery of battle and passion.”47 Yet jus in bello’s “desire to 
 
42. See GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 11; see generally CORN ET AL., AN 
OPERATIONAL APPROACH, supra note 41 at 40-50 (listing the treaties 
deemed to constitute conventional international humanitarian law).  
43. For example, the United States is not a State Party to the Additional 
Protocols I and II. See Treaties and State Parties to Such Treaties, 
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.x
sp?xp_countrySelected=US [https://perma.cc/H5DX-XC82] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2015).  
44. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Law: A 
contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in 
Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, No. 857 (2005), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0860. pdf 
[hereinafter ICRC Study]. 
45. A history of these legal regimes is outside the scope of this Article, but 
numerous wonderful such resources exist. See, e.g., LESLIE C. GREEN, 
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (3d ed. 2008); see 
generally GREENWOOD, supra note 2. 
46. Raphael Steenberghe, Proportionality under Jus Ad Bellum And Jus In 
Bello: Clarifying Their Relationship, 45 ISR. L. REV. 107, 118 (2012) 
(describing the aim of jus ad bellum, or at least its proportionality 
principle, as “to minimize the disturbance of the international social 
order”). See also Ian Brownlie, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE BY STATES 112 (1963). 
47. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 
BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 360, 363-4 (1952), reprinted in JUDITH GARDAM, 
ed., HUMANITARIAN LAW (1999); see also U.S. Department of Defense 
Law of War Manual, June 12, 2015, para. 1.3.4, (“[t]he main purposes of 
the law of war are: protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians 
from unnecessary suffering”), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-
Manual-June-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8P4-N52L].  
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diminish the evils of war”48 is balanced with military necessity.49 Jus 
in bello is not purely humanitarian in nature because it only limits, 
vice prohibits, the killing of innocent civilians and destruction of 
civilian property as a corollary of military necessity; the law is 
pragmatic at heart.50 Furthermore, because of their unique purposes, 
modern international humanitarian law and jus ad bellum primarily 
regulate, or at least influence, the decision-making of different types of 
State actors: jus ad bellum is directed toward those deciding to engage 
in armed conflict51 while jus in bello focuses primarily on those 
engaged in the fighting.52 
 
48. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1910), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4D47F
92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788&action=openDocument 
[https://perma.cc/A9G5-88FN] [hereinafter Hague IV]. 
49. See CORN ET AL., AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH, supra note 41, at 112; 
see also  DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 5 
(referring to this body of law as a “compromise formula” between 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations); Michael N. 
Schmitt, Military necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L., 
795, 796 (2010) (“the delicate balance …preserves the viability of IHL in 
a state-centric normative architecture”); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, 
Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond? 87 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US 
NAVAL WAR COL. 463, 465 (2011) (finding that the law of armed conflict 
establishes “an operable balance…that…does not make warfare 
impossible”). 
50. See DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 5 (“it can be 
categorically stated that no part of [the jus in bello] overlooks military 
requirements”).  
51. International criminal law, beginning with Nuremberg and continued by 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, recognizes that 
only certain high-level decision-makers are responsible for jus ad bellum 
decisions. See generally KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 184-188 
(2011) (describing the “leadership requirement” necessary for individual 
criminal responsibility for waging aggressive war contra jus ad bellum) 
[hereinafter HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS]; see also 
USA v. Wilherlm von Leeb et al., Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Vol. XI,  490 (holding that “[t]hose who 
commit the crime are those who participate at the policy making level 
in planning, preparing, or in initiating war. After war is initiated, and is 
being waged … [t]he crime at this stage likewise must be committed at 
the policy making level”). See The Crime of Aggression, I.C.C. Res.6 
(June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZY7-KMWF] (including as an element of the crime 
of aggression the requirement that “[t]he perpetrator was a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
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B.  Separation of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
Because it developed during what was known as the “war as fact” 
period, in which resort to war was considered a sovereign prerogative, 
none of the nineteenth and early twentieth century foundational 
codifications of today’s jus in bello made any of the protections or 
limitations on means and methods contingent on who was in the legal 
or moral right regarding the war itself.53 Hence, when international 
law experienced an extreme about-face in its treatment of war in the 
early twentieth century—pivoting from a jus ad bellum which largely 
viewed war as a legal means of national policy, to prohibiting it—jus 
in bello retained its original neutral quality.54 The jus ad bellum 
reversal formally began after World War I, with first the Covenant of 
the League of Nations and then the Kellog-Briand Pact55 outlawing 
war as an instrument of national policy.56 This pivot culminated in its 
modern form in the UN Charter, the codification of modern jus ad 
bellum.57  
As international humanitarian law was updated following World 
War II alongside this new jus ad bellum framework, it continued its 
independent application both in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in 
their 1977 Additional Protocols, the latter merging the traditional 
Geneva and Hague traditions.58 Article 2, common to all four 
 
military action of the State which committed the act of aggression”) 
[hereinafter AGGRESSION RESOLUTION].   
52. Of course there are times, such as when approving targets at high levels, 
that these decision-makers are one and the same, such as President 
Barack Obama’s approval of the raid targeting Osama Bin Laden. See 
Mark Bowden, The Death of Osama Bin Laden: How the U.S. Finally 
Got its Man, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/12/death-osama-bin-
laden-us [https://perma.cc/85LN-L54H]. 
53. DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 76, citing A.S. HERSHEY, THE 
ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 349 (1912) (characterizing 
war prior to World War I as “a right inherent in sovereignty itself”). 
54. DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 156 (characterizing this development 
as a “drastic modification of the jus ad bellum”).   
55. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter 
Kellogg-Briand Pact]. 
56. See generally Brownlie, Revisited, supra note 35, at 6; see also DINSETIN, 
WAR, supra note 19, at 83. 
57. Article 2(4)’s prohibition against the use of inter-state force also 
constitutes customary international law. See generally Gray, supra note 
35, at 30 (finding that it also constitutes jus cogens, but its scope 
remains undefined). 
58. See generally CORN ET AL., AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH, supra note 41, 
at 48-49 (discussing the merger effected by the 1977 protocols). 
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conventions, states that it applies in “all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict,” and Article 1, also common to all four 
conventions, states that the conventions apply “in all 
circumstances.”59 Additionally, Protocol I’s preamble states that jus in 
bello should apply “without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.”60 Furthermore, instead of 
war, with its formal triggering mechanisms carried over from the just 
war period, modern jus in bello is triggered by a de facto state of 
hostilities, with the causes for such hostilities irrelevant.61 
The idea that modern international humanitarian law operates 
independently from the UN Charter’s jus ad bellum framework, one 
that prohibits the resort to armed force except in cases of self-defense 
or when authorized by the Security Council, is considered axiomatic.62 
 
59. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, art. 1, 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.html 
[https://perma.cc/NJ2C-NSMB] [hereinafter GC IV]; see also Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, at 
preamble, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36b4.html 
[https://perma.cc/3GRQ-LSWF] [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see 
also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the III Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1 (Jean 
S. Pictet ed., 1960) (“It is clear, therefore, that the application of the 
Convention does not depend on whether the conflict is just or unjust. 
Whether or not it is a war of aggression, prisoners of war belonging to 
either party are entitled to the protection afforded by the Convention.”) 
[hereinafter Commentary to GC III].  
60. However, controversial components of Additional Protocol I reflect jus 
ad bellum considerations in their treatment of wars of national liberation 
as well as their relaxed standards for guerilla movements to obtain 
combatant status; such components are not considered customary 
international law. See generally Megret, supra note 22, at 121-22.  
61. See Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 40, at art. 2 para. 
1 (“[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of 
Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of 
war).  See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 562 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (requiring 
organized armed groups and intensity of violence for certain duration as 
triggering non-international armed conflict).  
62. See generally WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 490 (2012) 
(describing this equality of application as a “well-established principle”); 
see also MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW 
PROTECT IN WAR 85 (1999) (concluding that there is a “complete 
separation between the ius ad bellum and ius in bello;” such a division 
“implies that IHL applies whenever there is de facto an armed 
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Acceptance of such autonomous operation is reflected not only in 
academic circles, but in State practice, jurisprudence, and the law 
itself.63 Regardless of the legality or illegality of the war—the 
adherence or not to the UN Charter jus ad bellum—international 
humanitarian law regulates all parties to a conflict equally; this is 
referred to as the principle of equal application.64 Stated differently, 
jus in bello grants the same privileges and duties to all parties based 
on a de facto existence of armed conflict, unaffected by jus ad bellum 
considerations.65 As applied, if a State wages an illegal war of 
aggression, for example Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait, yet it adheres 
to the regulations contained in jus in bello, it can lawfully prosecute 
an unlawful war. Its leaders would be, theoretically, criminally liable 
for the international crime of aggression, but no one would be liable 
for the incidental deaths and destruction caused by military 
operations conducted pursuant to jus in bello.66 The reason for this 
anomalous result is that by thus insulating jus in bello from jus ad 
bellum, international law pragmatically incentivizes adherence to the 
former.67 Yet such insulation for those controlling the reins of 
government makes little sense, as their liability for the incidental 
deaths and destruction in war does not per se lessen their forces’ 
adherence to jus in bello.  
conflict…and that no ius ad bellum arguments may be used in 
interpreting IHL”); see generally Bugnion, supra note 7 at 39 (critiquing 
proposals to require differentiated jus in bello standards for aggressors, 
finding equal application works best for humanitarian reasons). 
63. See generally Antoine Bouvier, Assessing the Relationship Between Jus 
in Bello and Jus ad Bellum, An “Orthodox” View, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 109, 110 (2006). 
64. Moussa, supra note 30, at 967. 
65. See GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 10 (“Once hostilities have begun, the 
rules of IHL apply with equal force to both sides in the conflict, 
irrespective of who is the aggressor”);  see also BOOTHBY, supra note 62, 
at 490 (describing this equality of application as a “well-established 
principle); see also William A. Schabas, Lex Specialis? Belt and 
Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and The Law 
of Armed Conflict, And The Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum, 40 ISR. L. 
REV. 592, 593 (2007) (“International humanitarian law is predicated on 
an indifference to the origin of the conflict.”); see also Theodor Meron, 
Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and The Law of War, 86 Am. J. Int’l. L. 
1, 12 (1992) (stating that “[i]n contrast to medieval law, most modern 
rules of warfare (e.g., on requisitioning property and the treatment of 
prisoners of war and civilians, that is, jus in bello) apply equally to a 
state fighting a war of aggression and to one involved in lawful self-
defense.”). 
66. Senior military personnel may be liable for the crime of aggression if 
they fulfill the leadership element.  
67. See Jeff McMahan, Morality, Law, and The Relation Between Jus Ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46, 48 (2006). 
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This independent operation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
results in the equal application of the jus in bello to all parties to a 
conflict, and frankly made sense when there was parity on the jus ad 
bellum scene. However, this independence strengthened despite the 
momentous change in the jus ad bellum framework; such change 
removed the parity of warring parties by outlawing armed force as a 
means of national policy plus eventually criminalizing such wars of 
aggression.68 In addition to the historical influences outlined above, 
the equal application of jus in bello, despite the lack of equality of 
parties on the jus ad bellum level, stems largely from the overt 
recognition of the teleological purposes of the former: “[w]hy try to 
put an end to the unnecessary hardships of war? Out of respect for 
human personality, which centuries of civilization have gone to 
create.”69 Jus in bello as a legal regime attempts to mitigate suffering 
and reduce the violence associated with armed conflict, balanced with 
the recognition that warring parties still need to be able to achieve 
necessary military objectives—itself a paradoxical equipoise driven by 
mankind’s lamentable refusal to suppress armed violence.70 
While the indifferent application, one blind to the causes of the 
conflict, of jus in bello rests on that body of law’s overarching 
humanitarian goals, that does not logically mean that jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello have to remain independent for all players on both 
sides of conflict. The principle of equal application incentivizes those 
executing military force in an armed conflict to follow that body of 
law by granting them immunity for death and destruction they cause 
 
68. DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 156. 
69. Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 40 (explaining that 
the purpose of the 1949 Geneva Convention is “the same desire, now 
extended to others as well as to the wounded and sick, to mitigate the 
evils inseparable from war, to ameliorate the lot of the war victims, and 
to put an end to unnecessary hardships”). 
70. The equal application principle works in practice regarding non-state 
actors because of the accommodations in international humanitarian law 
itself for the asymmetry of the parties: jus in bello denies combatant 
immunity to non-state groups who fail to function like State militaries. 
See generally Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Privilege in 
Asymmetric & Covert Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 337, 345 (2015) 
(describing this accommodation). While this denial may seem driven 
solely to reinforce State sovereignty, it rests on humanitarian grounds, 
as requirements such as bearing arms openly, wearing uniforms, and 
being responsible to a chain of command help both fulfill the principle of 
distinction and ensure adherence to the rest of jus in bello, thus limiting 
the effect of war on civilians. Failure to fulfill such requirements, while 
exposing non-state armed groups to domestic prosecution for violent 
acts such as murder, does not relieve the opposing State of its jus in 
bello requirements, resting as they do on humanitarian, not reciprocity-
based, values. See generally Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra 
note 40, at art. 2. 
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as long as their acts of violence are in accordance with its rules.71 The 
national leaders responsible for aggressive war in violation of jus ad 
bellum are not similarly incentivized to follow jus in bello by a 
separation of the two legal regimes. They are not, because even if jus 
in bello is violated by their forces, they are not typically criminally 
liable for such a war crime, because they are not the ones executing 
the war. Theoretically a national leader could be responsible for a jus 
in bello violation through a command responsibility theory of liability, 
but this is one quite difficult to prove, given that jus ad bellum 
decision-makers do not typically execute the actual military 
operations regulated by jus in bello. Hence, lessening the separation of 
the legal regimes for those most responsible for the death and 
destruction caused by aggressive war aligns with the purposes of jus 
in bello—if the merger exists solely in the leadership realm, and only 
for those manifestly violating jus ad bellum.  
C.  On Lessening The Separation 
Modern war crimes trials have emphasized this division between 
legality of conduct in hostilities and that of jus ad bellum.72 Despite 
the overall illegality of Germany’s wars of aggression, not all Nazi 
actions in World War II were ipso facto considered illegal. The 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), faced with 
deciding the fate of the architects of the Holocaust and World War II, 
grappled with the potential legal linkage between war and warfare. Sir 
Hartley Shawcross, the British prosecutor who argued the case 
alongside Justice Robert Jackson from the United States, argued in 
his closing argument, in describing the indictments for crime against 
the peace, that:  
The killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in 
international and in municipal law, only where the war itself is 
legal. But where a war is illegal, as a war started not only in 
breach of the Pact of Paris but without any sort of warning or 
declaration clearly is, there is nothing to justify the killing, and 
 
71. Adam Roberts, The equal application of the laws of war: a principle 
under pressure, 90 Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross No. 872, pg. 932 (Dec. 31, 
2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-roberts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KV7H-A3T4]. 
72. See Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, 
¶1082 (Dec. 17, 2004) (“The unfortunate legacy of wars shows that ... 
many perpetrators believe that violations of binding international norms 
can be lawfully committed, because they are fighting for a ‘just 
cause.’”). 
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these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any 
other lawless robber bands.73 
The IMT itself never addressed this claim directly, and its 
findings never addressed the killings of soldiers on the battlefield 
normally immunized under jus in bello; it did, however, put the above 
statement in context with its famous observation that “[t]o initiate a 
war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is 
the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes 
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”74  
The American Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT), on the other 
hand, expressly disagreed with Sir Shawcross’s conflationary logic, 
stating in the Hostages trial that: 
[W]hatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and 
whether or not the cause be a so-called just cause, the same 
rules of international law are valid as to what must not be done, 
may be done, and must be done by the belligerents themselves 
in making war against each other.75 
Similarly, in the Justice Trial, the NMT opined that “under such 
reasoning, the rules of land warfare upon which the prosecution has 
relied would not be the measure of conduct, and the pronouncement 
of guilt in any case would become a mere formality.”76 Additionally, 
in the High Command case, the NMT explicitly disagreed with the 
 
73. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Vol. XIX, 458 (1948), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XIX.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YEQ6-LRZ6] (last visited July 9, 2015) (At the time 
Sir Shawcross was discussing the defendants’ culpability for crimes 
against the peace). 
74. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Vol. XXII, 426 (1948), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/09-30-46.asp [https://perma.cc/E6KG-
4DZE].  
75. USA v. William List et al., TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, Vol. XI, 1247 (1950), available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-
XI.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7DY-BXWR] [hereinafter The Hostages 
Trial]. 
76. USA v. Altstotter et al., LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 
Vol. VI, 52 selected and prepared by United Nations War Crimes 
Commission (1947-9), available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U6CJ-VJE5].  
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prosecution when the latter argued that jus in bello military necessity 
could never be utilized by those guilty of aggressive war.77 
More recent international criminal jurisprudence agrees with the 
Nuremberg conclusion that jus in bello operates relatively 
autonomously, apart from jus ad bellum, thus applying jus in bello 
equally to all parties in an armed conflict.78 The ICTY prosecution 
reaffirmed the distinction between the two regimes in its report 
regarding NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo,79 and the SCSL 
Appeals Chamber rebuked the trial chamber for its mitigation of 
punishment based on the defendant’s just cause, stating that such 
action “provides implicit legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally 
violates the law—the precise conduct this Special Court was 
established to punish.”80 Finally, jurisprudence from the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) generally affirms the separate application of jus 
in bello and jus ad bellum, despite confusion sowed by its conclusions 
in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons.81  
Sir Shawcross’s sentiment, that all killing in an illegal war is 
murder, is reminiscent of one of the most common criticisms of the 
operation of international humanitarian law independent from jus ad 
bellum: that based on moral grounds, the immunity for killing granted 
in a legal war should be revoked in an illegal one, thereby making the 
killing and destruction crimes instead of privileged conduct.82 Per this 
 
77. The German High Command Trial, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, Vol. XII, 125, selected and prepared by United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (1949), available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GSY-5J9M].  
78. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Tablada case 
found that the “application of the law is not conditioned by the causes 
of the conflict.” See Report No. 55/97, Argentina, Doc. 38, 1997, paras. 
173–174. 
79. See FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 22, para. 32. 
(noting that although “the precise linkage between jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello is not completely resolved… a certain crude reciprocity [of jus in 
bello obligations is] essential if the law was to have any positive 
impact”). 
80. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal 
Judgment, 529-30 (May 28, 2008) (describing the separation between jus 
in bello and jus ad bellum as a “bedrock principle” of the law of war). 
81. See generally DINSTEIN, WAR supra note 19, at 161-62 (describing the 
ICJ’s opinion as “enigmatic and vexing” and potentially a “dangerous 
departure from the concept that the jus in bello applies equally to all 
belligerents, irrespective of…the jus ad bellum.”).  
82. See generally McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War supra note 25, at 
30-33 (proposing a theory of accountability based on individual self-
defense that finds “combatants who fight for an unjust cause” are not 
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argument, primarily made in normative ethics literature,83 soldiers 
participating in conflicts in violation of jus ad bellum should not be 
accorded prisoner of war status; they should be “prosecuted and 
severely punished for any death or other injury that they may have 
caused in war.”84 This call to destroy the independent operation of the 
two legal regimes for all participants on the unjust side of a conflict 
stems largely from moral reasoning that analogizes warfare to the 
individual right of self-defense, with soldiers fighting aggressive wars 
not justified in their use of force against soldiers fighting in 
accordance with jus ad bellum –because the latter “lack liability for 
force being used against them.”85 This position denies a right to use 
self-defensive force against all those that pose a threat, because some 
who pose a threat, analogous to police officers, are justified in using 
force.86 Some philosophers go even further and ascribe liability to 
attack to those “morally responsible” for the aggressive war, 
expanding such liability to both belligerents, (soldiers or members of 
an armed group,) as well as civilians.87 
Suggestions to infuse the jus in bello proportionality principle 
with jus ad belllum considerations are related to such asymmetrical 
arguments dealing with the moral and legal liability of belligerents 
killing other belligerents in war.88 The principle of jus in bello 
 
privileged to kill opposing combatants); see also DINSTEIN, WAR, supra 
note 19, at 157; see also Rodin, Liability, supra note 25, at 591 
(characterizing the lack of accountability of soldiers for prosecuting wars 
of aggression as a “liability gap” to be remedied). 
83. But see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 34, 41, 21 (1977) 
(arguing for “the moral equality of soldiers” who possess “an equal right 
to kill” because it is “perfectly possible … for an unjust war to be fought 
in strict accordance with the rules”). Walzer’s renewal of just war 
theory in the 1970s aligned the tradition with prevailing international 
law norms regarding the independence of the two legal regimes. See Jeff 
McMahan, The Morality and the Law of War, in JUST AND UNJUST 
WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 19 (David 
Rodin & Henry Shue eds., 2008) [hereinafter McMahan, THE MORALITY] 
(stating that the law of war should be separated from morality). 
84. DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 157;  
85. David Rodin, LIABILITY, supra note 25, at 592-93; McMahan, THE 
MORALITY, supra note 83, at 21-22 (explaining that individual self-
defense, contra Walzer’s position, does not justify threat-based killing 
because not all those who pose a threat, such as a police officer using 
justified force or a victim using force in self-defense, forfeit their right 
not to be attacked in response).   
86. See McMahan, THE MORALITY, supra note 83. 
87. See McMahan, THE MORALITY, supra note 83. 
88. David Rodin & Henry Shue, Introduction, in JUST AND UNJUST 
WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 2 (David Rodin 
& Henry Shue eds., 2008) (describing an “asymmetry thesis” which 
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proportionality, codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions (AP I), prohibits attacks “which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”89 
Some ethicists, vaguely echoed by some State treatment of 
proportionality,90 argue that military advantages only possess 
instrumental value derived from a broader context—the context of 
the conflict itself.91  
According to this ethical reasoning, neither blowing up a bridge 
nor destroying a weapons depot carries intrinsic value; the military 
advantage gained is the contribution such destruction makes to the 
overall war ledger for that particular belligerent party.92 Hence, if the 
war itself carries no moral or legal weight because it is one of 
aggression, the contextual value derived from that war is negative, 
thus making the destruction and deaths caused disproportionate.93 
Taken to an extreme, this argument suggests that because the 
aggressor party’s aims are illegitimate, the means used to fulfill the 
immoral and illegal ends are ipso facto illegitimate as well.94 This 
Article now turns to applying similar reasoning solely to those most 
 
provides unequal rights and obligations under jus in bello). See e.g., 
McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 25 at 34; see also 
Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 34, 35 (2004); cf. Rodin, Liability, supra note 25 (providing a 
consequentialist argument for expanding proportionality to consider the 
war’s aims). 
89. See AP I, supra note 20, at art. 51.  
90. See infra Part III. 
91. See generally Rodin, LIABILITY supra note 25, at 596-97 (finding that 
military advantages gain value from “the broader project of which it is a 
part”). 
92. Rodin, LIABILITY supra note 25, at 596-97. 
93. Rodin, LIABILITY supra note 25, at 596-97; see also McMahan, The 
Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 25, at 29. 
94. See generally Judith Lichtenberg, How to Judge Soldiers Whose Cause 
is Unjust, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
STATUS OF SOLDIERS 121 (David Rodin & Henry Shue, eds., 2008) 
(summarizing and critiquing this approach). Such an argument has been 
advanced regarding the opposite dynamic, that jus ad bellum has been 
used to impermissibly relax jus in bello standards for those on the right 
side of jus ad bellum. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, The Principle of Equal 
Application of the Laws of War, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE 
MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 226, 227 (David Rodin and 
Henry Shue eds., 2008) (describing the position that wider jus in bello 
rights should be afforded to those whose side is in conformity with jus 
ad bellum). 
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responsible for the armed conflict itself:  those who commit the crime 
of aggression. 
 
II. War Crimes As Shadow Crimes of Aggression 
A.  The Gap 
Both the international Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions of the 
Nazi and Japanese architects of World War II included “crimes 
against peace,” crimes which provided “individual responsibility for 
illegal war.”95 The International Military Tribunal Charter, annexed 
to the 1945 London Agreement, defined such crimes in Article 6(a): 
“Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or 
 waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing.”96 
Subsequently, the IMT, in finding twelve defendants guilty of 
such crimes, famously characterized this category: “[t]o initiate a war 
of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the 
supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in 
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”97 In 
holding individual high-level participants in State aggression 
 
95. Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 1, 1 (2009). Twelve defendants were found guilty of crimes against 
peace during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(hereinafter Nuremberg IMT) and twenty-five at the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo. See generally CASSESE’S 
ICL supra note 12, at 136. Attempts were unsuccessfully made earlier 
than Nuremberg to hold individuals criminally responsible for aggressive 
wars, such as the charge against the German Kaiser, Wilhelm III, of “a 
supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties” found in the Versailles Treaty of Peace following World War I. 
See Wesibord, supra note 95, at 65. 
96. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp [https://perma.cc/ZF2U-
6SPJ] (last visited July 22, 2015).  
97. NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGRESSION INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIALS 
NURNBERG 16 (1947) available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Nazi-opinion-
judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XBS-3V5S] [hereinafter Nuremberg 
Judgment]. The Allies also established Control Council Law, no. 10 to 
establish uniform crimes for prosecution in each of the allied zones of 
occupation; this statute also included crimes against peace, a crime 
subsequently prosecuted by both the United States and France in their 
zones of occupation. See HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
supra note 51, at 107, 179. 
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accountable for illegal war, the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMT 
recognized the deleterious consequences of all wars; consequences that 
are morally and legally unjustifiable in all but exceptional 
circumstances.98 Controversially, crimes against peace at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo broke with the tradition of State responsibility 
mechanisms, such as reparations, to instead hold individuals, and not 
simply their States, accountable for waging war in violation of 
international law.99  
Yet, since Nuremberg and Tokyo, international criminal bodies 
have not taken on this crime of illegal war.100 For example, neither the 
constitutional statute of the ICTY nor the ICTR includes the crime of 
aggressive war; these courts’ jurisdictions are limited to crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocide.101 This gap in international 
criminal law is deeply concerning, demonstrating a failure of 
accountability, deterrence, and retribution.102 Additionally, this 
inability to prosecute violations of jus ad bellum perverts the legal 
separation of jus ad bellum from jus in bello; serious war crimes 
perpetrators are criminally punishable on the international plane, yet 
 
98. Not all violations of jus ad bellum constitute a crime against the peace—
only wars of aggression. See DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 121. 
99. See DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 121; see also CASSESE’S ICL, 
supra note 12, at 136, n. 7 (noting the subsequent criticism against these 
crimes as violations of the principle of legality, given that State 
responsibility did not translate to individual criminal responsibility). 
100. Despite the failure to prosecute those guilty of aggressive war since 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, “the criminality of aggressive war has 
entrenched itself in an impregnable position in contemporary 
international law.” DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 124, 122-131 
(describing the UN General Assembly’s series of resolutions affirming 
Nuremberg’s crimes against peace as well as complementary efforts by 
the International Law Commission to flesh out the crime of aggression 
as demonstrative of this entrenchment). Domestic criminal prosecutions 
of this crime have likewise been non-existent; despite the Iraqi High 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, for example, the 
crime was never prosecuted. See CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 137-
38. 
101. See ICTY, supra note 14; see also ICTR supra note 15; see also 
CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 138-39 (attributing the lack of 
“international follow-up to the criminalization of aggression after 1947” 
to various factors such as Cold War politics and the ambiguity inherent 
in the UN Charter jus ad bellum).  Hybrid courts have also lacked 
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression; see e.g. supra note 16. 
102. See generally Donald M. Ferencz, Aggression in Legal Limbo: A Gap in 
the Law that Needs Closing, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 507 
(2013) (describing concerns such as lack of accountability and deterrence 
resulting from the lack of criminal accountability for crimes of 
aggression). 
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those who illegally unleash war’s terrific violence remain criminally 
immune for such unleashing.103  
The lack of international criminal accountability for the most 
extreme violation of jus ad bellum, wars of aggression, is arguably 
mitigated by the increasing attention paid to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity within international criminal law.104 Such attention 
is a much needed positive step, particularly as the latter also accounts 
for atrocities committed outside of a war context.105 Yet the ability 
and will to prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes on the 
international level are alone insufficient. In the words of the 
indomitable Benjamin Ferencz, the famed U.S. prosecutor of the 
NMT Einstatzgruppen Trial and a driving force behind the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court, without the ability 
to prosecute the crime of aggression, “aggressors will know that they 
remain immune and cannot face trial . . . [i]nstead of deterring war, 
they will be encouraged to make war.”106 Hence the application of 
 
103. Or, even more perversely, if the ensuing illegal war is conducted per jus 
in bello—an illegal war fought legally—there would be zero criminal 
accountability for the deaths and destruction that jus in bello 
unfortunately tolerates. See generally CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 
64 (noting that prior to Nuremberg, low-ranking members of armed 
forces could be held accountable for misconduct during war but “states 
alone could be called to account by other states” for initiating war or 
other “gross misconduct”). 
104. See generally Gow, supra note 12, at 17, 21 (describing the growing 
influence of international criminal law as well as human rights law on 
the conduct of warfare). 
105. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 7 (requiring that culpable acts “be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack” but not 
requiring a nexus to war or armed conflict).  
106. Ben Ferencz, Letter to Admiral Mueller Re Aggression, BEN FERENCZ, 
(Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.benferencz.org/2010-
2015.html#admiralmullen [https://perma.cc/LQ9J-6DVH]; see also 
Mark Hull, “Vengeance is not our Goal”: A Conversation with 
Nuremberg Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz WARONTHEROCKS (Aug. 5, 
2014), http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/vengeance-is-not-our-goal-a-
conversation-with-nuremberg-prosecutor-benjamin-ferencz/ 
[https://perma.cc/8W8P-4TMS]. 
 Nuremberg held that war making was no longer a national right. It was 
an international crime for which those responsible, the leaders re — I’m 
not talking about the common soldier who goes out and fights — I’m 
talking about those who plan and perpetrate the aggressive war, will be 
held to account in a court of law. That was the most important lesson 
which came out of Nuremberg. As you well know, it was ignored after 
Nuremberg. We’ve had a hundred wars since then. Another hundred 
million people killed. The international community had an obligation to 
do better. 
 Id.; see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of 
Aggression, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 281, 284 (2009) (emphasizing 
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criminal law specifically to those guilty of waging wars of aggression is 
needed for humanity’s sake, and this Article now turns to specifically 
focus on that task. 
Criminal law, including international criminal law, is an 
expression of society’s collective moral condemnation of particular 
conduct; the gravamen of every malum in se crime represents the 
essence of why society wants to punish, and thereby deter, such 
behavior.107 The gravamen of the crime of aggression, the purpose for 
punishing such acts, is not equivalent to that of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. This crime, specifically, condemns intentional 
violations of those international laws—today the UN Charter—
designed to maintain global peace among States.108 While wars of 
aggression are malum in se because they often result in extreme 
devastation and loss of innocent life (by lawful conduct as well as 
through war crimes and crimes against humanity), the orchestration 
of such wars must also be criminally punished because of the 
credibility test they pose to international law itself: they threaten the 
law’s ability to maintain relations among States.109 The crime of 
aggression “is inimical to a rules-based international order, and to the 
cause of peace and security”110 and its criminalization condemns “the 
destruction of the minimum elements of trust which can hold the 
community of nations together in peace and progress.”111 These 
 
that without a viable crime of aggression, “tyrants and dictators would 
more likely be emboldened to flaunt their immunity by defiant acts of 
aggressive war”). 
107. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil 
sanction and all that distinguishes it…is the judgment of community 
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
108. See generally G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974), available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GAres3314.html 
[https://perma.cc/8B9J-4LTV].  
109. See generally Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy of an International Crime: 
Aggression at the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. L. R. 1, 3 
(2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209687 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209687 [https://perma.cc/8NDS-STJ9 ] 
(“the gravity of the crime of aggression is underscored by the fact that 
it frequently creates the conditions of conflict and upheaval in which 
other atrocity crimes are likely to be perpetrated”) [hereinafter Gillett, 
The Anatomy]. 
110. Beth Van Schaack, U.S. Policy on the ICC Crime of Aggression 
Announced, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://justsecurity.org/22248/u-s-policy-icc-crime-aggression/ 
[https://perma.cc/8D8Z-5LC6] (repeating the U.S. State Department’s 
Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights 
remarks regarding the ICC’s crime of aggression). 
111. Robert Jackson, Justice Jackson’s Report to the President on the 
Atrocities and War Crimes; June 7, 1945, United States Department of 
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foundational aspects of the crime of aggression contrast with, for 
example, the gravamen of war crimes.112 The latter consist of serious 
violations of the rules of international humanitarian law—rules 
designed, as mentioned above, not to maintain global peace, but 
instead built to allow war to be conducted in a manner that lessens 
the suffering of all involved.113  
Yet, because the crime of aggressive war deals with the most 
difficult task of international law—its ability to maintain global 
peace—it is also the most political of international crimes, and 
continues to face an uphill battle regarding formal criminal 
prosecution in modern international fora.114 While the Rome Statute, 
in establishing the ICC in 1998, listed “[t]he crime of aggression,” 
as among “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole,” it left it undefined and subject to future 
jurisdictional requirements.115 While these gaps were subsequently 
filled by a 2010 amendment to the Rome Statute, the jurisdictional 
hurdles remain quite high; the likelihood of an ICC prosecution for 
the crime of aggression remains slim.116 The following section outlines 
 
State Bulletin (Government Printing Office) (1945), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack01.asp 
[https://perma.cc/H27M-9TL5] (July 17, 2015). 
112. But see Benjamin B. Ferencz, A New Approach to Deterring Illegal 
Wars, appendix to Donald M. Ferencz, Aggression in Legal Limbo: A 
Gap in the Law that Needs Closing, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
507, 520 (2013) (highlighting the similarities between the crime of 
aggression and crimes against humanity, finding that “[w]hat the crime 
is called should not be decisive”).  
113. The threat to international order is also missing from crimes against 
humanity, which now exists distinct from the context of war, though 
there can be overlap between the two crimes. See, e.g., Ventura & 
Gillett, The Fog of War, supra note 11, at 524 (noting “[t]he close 
relationship between armed conflict and crimes against humanity” while 
also noting the modern severance of a required link between the two). 
114. See Van Schaack, supra note 110 (describing the United States’ 
opposition to activation of this crime under the Rome Statute, concerns 
that appear to represent the challenges involved in states ceding 
sovereignty to international law).  
115. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 5 (listing four crimes, including 
“[t]he crime of aggression,” as  ”the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole,” yet specifying in Article 5.2 
that the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression until it was later defined by amendment and jurisdictional 
triggers established). 
116. See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Sadly Neutered Crime of 
Aggression, OPINIO JURIS (June 13, 2010, 9:24 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/13/the-sadly-neutered-crime-of-
aggression/ [https://perma.cc/RE7V-M9XD] (describing the limited 
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the new Rome Statute definition of the crime of aggression, and then 
compares its elements to that of various ICC war crimes to determine 
whether overlap exists that could provide some measure of 
accountability for the crime of aggression through a war crimes 
prosecution. 
B.  ICC Crime of Aggression and War Crimes: Definitions and Elements 
1. ICC Crime of Aggression 
As mentioned above, the Rome Statute placed the crime of 
aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction—along with genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes—but did not define it nor provide 
jurisdictional provisions until the 2010 Kampala Agreements.117 The 
resultant amendments to the Rome Statute contain, inter alia, Article 
8bis, which defines the crime of aggression:118 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity  and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means 
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a 
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
qualify as an act of aggression . . . .119   
 
jurisdiction of the ICC regarding this crime); see also Ventura & Gillett, 
The Fog of War, supra note 11, at 524 n.2 (concluding that “the ICC is 
unlikely to be seized of an aggression case in the foreseeable future”). 
117. But see Van Schaack, supra note 110 (the United States has noted the 
“uncertainty that still surrounds crucial aspects of the amendments”).  
118. This definition draws upon the IMT London Charter, the UN Charter, 
and the seminal 1974 UNGA Resolution. See CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 
12, at 139; see also Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The 
Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 1179, 1188 (2010) (explaining that “it was never disputed that the 
precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo provided crucial guidance in 
defining the crime” of aggression).  
119. See Rome Statute supra note 8. The amendments also included 
jurisdictional requirements.  
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The actus reus of this crime involves the “planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution” of a predicate State act of aggression,120 
defined in Article 8bis as armed forced by a State “against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State.”121 Per these explicit terms, violent acts by non-state actors are 
excluded unless their action is attributable to a State.122 Article 8bis 
also provides a non-exclusive list of qualifying acts of aggression, 
including invasions or attacks on another State’s territory, military 
occupation, annexation of territory by force, bombardment, blockades, 
and large-scale attacks on the armed forces of another State.123  
For criminal liability to attach, such acts of aggression must also 
specifically be considered “manifest violations” of the UN Charter, 
with regard to their character, gravity and scale.124 Lesser acts of 
aggression may give rise to State responsibility for breaches of jus ad 
bellum, but only those deemed “manifest violations” carry individual 
criminal liability.125 This requirement was deemed necessary during 
drafting to ensure that only clear violations of the UN Charter would 
lead to criminal responsibility, given the well-noted ambiguities 
regarding the permissible exceptional uses of force under the modern 
jus ad bellum.126 Commentators have assessed this manifest qualifier 
as signifying that the crime must involve only those acts of aggression 
which are “large-scale and produce serious consequences;” this 
severity criterion echoes the Rome Statute’s preambulatory language 
 
120. See Gillett, The Anatomy, supra note 109, at 7 (bifurcating the crime of 
aggression into the crime involving individual responsibility, and the 
predicate State conduct of an act of aggression). 
121. An act of aggression also includes the use of armed force by a State “in 
any other manner inconsistent with” the UN Charter. See Elements of 
Crimes, Int’l Criminal Court at p. 43 art. 8bis para. 2 (2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-
45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTB6-
UTJJ] (last visited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter EOC]. 
122. See Rome Statute, supra note 8; see also CASSESE’S ICL supra note 12, 
at 140. 
123. See EOC, supra note 121, at p. 43 art. 8 bis. 
124. See EOC, supra note 121, at p. 43 art. 8 bis para. 1; see also Kreß & 
Holtzendorff, supra note 118, at 1192. 
125. See generally CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 140; see also Kreß & 
Holtzendorff, supra note 118, at 1192, 1200. 
126. See generally Kreß & Holtzendorff, supra note 118, at 1192-93, 1211 
(acknowledging a “grey area of legal controversy” surrounding 
prohibited uses of force under the UN Charter, areas of ambiguity which 
the crime of aggression is designed to avoid via the manifest element; 
“the requirement of ‘manifest illegality’ takes due regard of the fact 
that, regrettably, the primary norm of the prohibition of the use of force 
suffers from considerable ambiguity”). 
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that the ICC was established to deal with “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”127 
Article 8bis also possesses a leadership requirement, one traceable 
to the Nuremberg IMT. In order for criminal liability to attach, the 
required act must be by conducted “by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State.”128 This leadership requirement is also replicated in 
Rome Statute Article 25 (the statute’s modes of liability section), to 
ensure that average soldiers cannot be prosecuted for the crime of 
aggression via accomplice liability such as aiding and abetting.129  
Regarding the mens rea, or subjective mental element of the 
crime of aggression, Article 8bis is complemented by Article 30, which 
requires that all of the material elements of ICC crimes be committed 
with both intent and knowledge.130 The amendments to the Rome 
Statute regarding the crime of aggression provide further clarification 
by specifying a lesser “knowledge of fact” mental state regarding the 
use of force’s violation of the UN Charter; the amendment only 
requires awareness “of the factual circumstances” which make the 
armed force in question inconsistent, and manifestly so, with the UN 
Charter.131 The amendments also clarify that “[t]here is no 
requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation 
as to whether the use of armed force was inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations” and similarly, “[t]here is no 
requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation 
as to the ‘manifest’ nature of the violation” of the UN Charter.132 
Finally, some commentators have controversially argued that there is 
 
127. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at pmbl. Additionally, the amendment 
listing elements of the crime of aggression provides:  “[t]he term 
‘manifest’ is an objective qualification.” See AGGRESSION RESOLUTION, 
supra note51, at 21-22. 
128. See AGGRESSION RESOLUTION, supra note 51, at 17; see generally Kreß & 
Holtzendorff, supra note 118, at 1189 (describing the crime of aggression 
as “an absolute leadership crime” that is “differentiated” from the other 
ICC crimes).  
129. Rome Statute supra note 8, at Article 25(3) bis; see Kreß & 
Holtzendorff, supra note 118, at 1189; see also Gillett, The Anatomy, 
supra note 109, at 26 (“[c]onsequently, common foot soldiers cannot and 
will not be charged for aggression before the ICC”); see also Gillett, The 
Anatomy, supra note 109, at 26 (noting that “the leadership clause 
would ordinarily be considered to cover the high level military and 
political leadership” as well as others, such as the German industrialists 
tried for aggression by the IMT and NMT). 
130. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 30(1). 
131. See AGGRESSION RESOLUTION, supra note 51, at 21; EOC, supra note 
121, at p. 43 art. 8 bis Elements 4 and 6. 
132. EOC, supra note 121, at p. 43 art. 8 bis Introduction, paras. 1 and 4. 
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an additional special or specific intent requirement for the crime of 
aggression:  “a malevolent purpose or animus malus held by the 
attacking State.”133 This intent, it is argued, is such that the act be 
committed with “the will to achieve territorial gains,” or the act was 
otherwise “an instrument of national policy.”134 Yet, since no such 
intent is expressed in the amendments to the Rome Statute, it 
appears to either not be required, or is subsumed in the manifest 
violation of the UN Charter requirement itself.135 
2. ICC War Crimes 
As mentioned above, war crimes consist of serious violations of 
the rules of international humanitarian law, a body of law whose 
objective is to limit the effects of war; its rules allow war to be 
conducted in a manner that lessens the suffering of all involved while 
also enhancing the discipline, and hence, effectiveness, of the military 
forces who abide by its rules.136 Not every crime committed during an 
armed conflict is a war crime, and not every violation of jus in bello 
constitutes a war crime either:  there must be a nexus to both the 
armed conflict and a serious violation.137 These requirements exist 
 
133. Gillett, The Anatomy, supra note 109, at 11. 
134. See Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Grass that Gets Trampled when Elephants 
Fight’: Will the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect 
Women?, SANTA CLARA UNIV. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO.10-
10 1-47, 13 (2010) (concluding that “the mere crossing of an 
international border by military forces without the consent of the 
neighboring State, for example, could be condemned an act of aggression 
regardless…of the motive or intent behind the operation,” finding that 
there is no special intent requirement). But see Gillett, The Anatomy, 
supra note 109, at 11 (concluding that “[i]t is unclear whether the 
qualifiers concern the subjective purpose for which the force is used (to 
the extent a State may have a subjective will), or the objective results of 
the use of force”). 
135. But see CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 142 (citing to S. Glaser in 
support of such a special intent); see also Gillett, The Anatomy supra 
note 109, at 11. 
136. See supra Part I.A (outlining the purposes of modern IHL); see also 
Willem-Jan Van Der Wolf, WAR CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 7 (Willem-Jan Van Der Wolf ed., 2010) (“This body of law 
declares certain behaviors impermissible, in order to limit the harmful 
effects of armed conflicts on participants and non-participants alike.”); 
see also CORN ET. AL., AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH, supra note 41, at 
467 (highlighting “the relationship between sanctioning violations of 
those rules and disciplined military forces”). 
137. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Punishment of War Crimes, 21 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 74 (1944); see generally CASSESE’S ICL, supra 
note 12, at 77-79 (discussing the nexus to armed conflict as “linking the 
armed conflict to the crime, not the criminal”); see also DINSTEIN, 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 263. 
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both to avoid having opportunistic but ordinary crime occurring 
during an armed conflict considered as war crimes, and to ensure that 
not every violation of the myriad rules of warfare is stigmatized as a 
war crime.138 A noted commentator finds that the general “rationale 
behind the punishment of war crimes” is to ensure individual 
accountability of “those who, during an armed conflict, seriously 
contravene rules of IHL against persons protected by such rules.”139 
It is worth noting that jus in bello historically, and today 
primarily, speaks to States and their duties to the international 
community, making them responsible for the acts of their armed 
forces.140 Modern jus in bello obligates States to wage war in 
accordance with it by ensuring those under their control adhere to the 
law, requiring domestic criminal sanctions as part of such control.141 
For example, the Geneva Conventions specifies that State parties 
“undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, 
any of the grave breaches” of the Conventions.142  
 
138. See generally CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 78 (noting that a crime 
committed, for example, by one combatant against a fellow combatant 
during an armed conflict is not a war crime, even though the conflict 
provided the opportunity and context for the crime; the offense must be 
“perpetrated to (wrongly) pursue the purposes of war.”). 
139. Cassese’s ICL supra note 12, at 68. 
140. The Hague Convention, 18 October 1907, provides in Article 3 that:  
 A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations 
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces. 
 see Hague (IV), supra note 48, at art.3; see also Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, 63-65, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001); see generally 
Frits Kalshoven, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed 
Forces, in JUDITH GARDAM ed, HUMANITARIAN LAW 267, 267-8 (1999) 
(highlighting that the “armed forces furnish a striking example of an 
organ whose acts may be so attributable and hence engage the 
responsibility of the State”); see also CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 
67 (pointing out that States are IHL’s “main addresses,” not 
individuals); Van Der Wolf, supra note 136, at 13 (describing States as 
“the classic bearers of international law”).  
141. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 559 (2005). 
142. See GC I, supra note 40, at art. 49; see also Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; GC IV, supra note 59, at art. 146; 
see generally Van Der Wolf, supra note 136, at 11. 
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Prior to such modern requirements, domestic military criminal 
systems have long criminally sanctioned certain misconduct by their 
own soldiers143 that today constitutes war crimes, such as pillaging, 
robbery, etc., out of the need to maintain effective fighting forces—as 
well as out of a recognition that such rules ease the transition to 
peace by avoiding the alienation of local populations.144 On the 
international level, individual international criminal liability notably 
came to the fore following World War II; however, international trials 
such as that of Peter von-Hagenbach in 1474 and that of William 
Wallace by Edward I are considered by commentators as early 
examples of international war crimes trials.145 Yet it was Nuremberg 
that transformed extant international humanitarian law into a body 
of law that provided for individual, and not just State, responsibility 
for serious infractions of its rules.146 While subsequent jus in bello 
treaties specified particular conduct as war crimes—in particular the 
Geneva Conventions’ grave breaches system—serious violations of 
customary international humanitarian law also constitute war crimes, 
and it is in this area that the Rome Statute makes particular 
headway.147 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute carries on the Nuremberg legacy of 
individual criminal responsibility for serious breaches of jus in bello.148 
It defines war crimes for prosecution by the ICC, and Article 8(1) 
notes that the ICC “shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in 
particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
 
143. States also criminally sanctioned certain violations by enemy soldiers of 
the victor’s State’s early codes of war. See generally DINSTEIN, CONDUCT 
OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 253. 
144. See generally CORN ET AL., AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH, supra note 41, 
at 467 (noting that “some of the greatest military leaders in history 
recognized the benefits derived from regulating battlefield conduct” and 
noting that limiting war’s brutality aids in the restoration of peace). 
145. See Gow, supra note 12, at 50-51; see also CORN ET AL., AN 
OPERATIONAL APPROACH, supra note 41, at 470; see generally CASSESE’S 
ICL, supra note 12, at 67. But see DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, 
supra note 12, at 253 (claiming that “[s]ince time immemorial, 
international law has allowed other States—in particular, the enemy 
State(s), to prosecute persons accused of war crimes”). 
146. See Gow, supra note 12, at 52.   
147. See. e.g., GC I supra note 40, at art. 50; see also GC II, supra note 142, 
at art. 51; GC III, supra note 142, at art. 130; GC IV, supra note 59, at 
art. 147. 
148. The ICC treatment of war crimes helps fill the gaps left by the London 
Charter and IHL treaties such as the Geneva Conventions; it does so by 
providing elements, mens rea and actus reus components, etc. See 
generally Pocar, supra note 12. 
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large-scale commission of such crimes.”149 While this qualifier seems to 
focus the Court on systematic large-scale crimes, the statute does not 
exclude isolated war crimes as a jurisdictional matter.150 Article 
8(2)(a) includes as war crimes grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, which deal with particular acts against 
protected persons and property, such as willful killing and torture.151 
Per the Geneva Conventions, grave breaches only occur during 
international armed conflicts; Article 8(2)(b) supplements these grave 
breaches with “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict,” specifically listing twenty-
six separate offenses.152 These enumerated offenses reflect violations of 
the principles of international humanitarian law; for example, 
distinction and proportionality are reflected in Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 
(iv), respectively: 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population 
as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities; 
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that 
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians 
or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated.153 
Non-international armed conflict, that between a State or States 
and an organized armed group or solely between or among such 
groups, is provided for in the Rome Statute’s Article 8(2)(c)-(f); this 
is a shorter list of war crimes than those the statute provides for 
international conflicts.154 These include violations of Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions, as well as a circumscribed list of fifteen 
distinct crimes under Article 8(2)(e) (as compared to twenty-six 
 
149. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(1). 
150. See generally CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 80 (stating that the ICC 
Statute drafters wanted “to limit the Court’s jurisdiction over war 
crimes to those….more conspicuous” crimes and those that “may involve 
a plurality of persons or constitute part of a general practice”). 
151. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(a)(i)-(viii). 
152. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(xxvi). 
153. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(b)(i) and (iv). 
154. See CASSESE’S ICL supra note 12, at 82 (noting the current trend in 
customary international law as moving toward the same IHL rules 
applying in both international and non-international armed conflicts, 
despite Article 8’s contrary direction). 
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within international armed conflicts).155 Notably, the above 
prohibition against disproportionate attacks, relevant in international 
armed conflicts per Article 8(2)(b)(iv), is not considered a war crime 
during non-international armed conflicts.156 The Statute does, 
however, prohibit as a war crime during non-international armed 
conflicts crimes such as intentionally attacking civilians and/or 
civilian objects, “[d]estroying or seizing the property of an adversary 
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of the conflict,” etc.157 
III. Prosecuting The Crime of Aggression As A War 
Crime 
A.  Key Assumptions And Elemental Background 
The following exercises are specifically aimed at exploring 
whether, given Article 8bis’s current desuetude, a clear case of 
criminal aggression can be incorporated within a prosecution of an 
Article 8 war crime.158 This analysis assumes that the crime of 
aggression has occurred—that all of the elements of that crime have 
been met—but that it cannot be charged as such in the ICC because 
of jurisdictional and political hurdles. To make this analysis more 
straightforward, the assumed crime of aggression is unambiguous: 
Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait is used below as the 
exemplar crime of aggression, with supporting assumptions that Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait constituted a manifest violation of the UN 
Charter, and that Hussein’s particular acts, coupled with the requisite 
intent, as the head of the Iraqi State, met the below elements of 
 
155. See GC III, supra note 142, at art. 3; see also Rome Statute, supra note 
8, at art. 8(2)(e).  
156. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
157. See Rome Statute, supra note 8,at art. at 8(2)(e)(i) and (xii). While 
disproportionate attacks are not considered by Article 8 to constitute 
war crimes during non-international armed conflicts, the ICTY utilized 
instances of grossly disproportionate attacks to find that civilians had 
been intentionally attacked; that is, disproportionate attacks were shoe-
horned into the crime of intentional attacks against civilians. See 
Bartels supra note 18, at 283 (finding that ICTY’s determination of 
proportionality “violations merely serve as evidence of attacks directed 
against civilians or against civilian objects”); see also Prosecutor v. 
Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2M6-V3G2] [hereinafter Galic Trial Judgment]. 
158. The need to initially utilize relatively non-controversial and clear 
examples of both crimes stems from the numerous problems associated 
with using situations at the margins. 
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criminal aggression.159 This clarity is needed to sharpen the focus 
regarding the purpose of this analysis, which is not to explore the 
crime of aggression per se, but to demonstrate whether or not the 
criminal prosecution of a war crime before the ICC can 
simultaneously sanction the crime of aggression without the latter 
crime being separately charged. 
The below analysis first briefly discusses various modes of liability 
as potential avenues for incorporating the crime of aggression into a 
war crime prosecution. This discussion sharply reveals the distinct 
natures of jus ad bellum and jus in bello sketched in Part I of this 
Article, and highlights the difficulties of tying jus in bello crimes to 
the high-level officials who, per the leadership requirement of the 
crime of aggression, constitute the sole type of individual who can be 
guilty of this crime.160 This brief examination focuses on particular 
means of participating in a war crime which would seem, though 
unlikely, the most realistic option for finding a Saddam Hussein-type 
aggressor liable for war crimes physically perpetrated by others. These 
separate means include, the actus reus of ordering such a crime; 
aiding and abetting; accessorial-type liability for the war crime; as 
well as superior responsibility as a mode of liability. After this review 
the analysis turns to its primary inquiry, which proposes prosecuting 
the crime of aggression as a war crime of excessive incidental death, 
injury or damage (the war crime of excessive, or disproportionate, 
attack).161 
To make such inquiries, several initial background elemental 
considerations are needed. To best discuss modes of liability and how 
a crime of aggression can be included within a prosecution for war 
crimes, a specific war crime is chosen as an exemplar from the long 
and non-exhaustive Article 8 list, and its exact elements 
unpackaged.162 The Elements of Crimes (EOC), the document 
providing interpretative guidance regarding ICC crimes, clarifies the 
mens rea required for all ICC crimes in its general introduction.163 It 
reiterates that the Rome Statute Article 30’s intent and knowledge 
 
159. See S.C. Res. 660 at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990). 
160. See generally supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the leadership requirement). 
161. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
162. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
163. Article 9 of the Rome Statute directs that non-binding elements of the 
ICC crimes be developed as interpretative aids to assist the ICC judges; 
a preparatory commission subsequently did so for all but the crime of 
aggression, whose elements were formulated during the 2010 Review 
Conference of Rome Statute and its amendments. KNUT DORMANN, 
ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 2 (2003); 
see also EOC, supra note 121. 
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threshold164 is required for all material elements165 of war crimes 
“unless otherwise provided.”166 Article 30 defines intent regarding 
conduct as “that person means to engage in the conduct” and, 
regarding a particular consequence, “that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”167 Article 30 further defines knowledge as “awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course 
of events.”168  
Critically, the EOC’s general introduction clarifies that intent and 
knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances and facts, and that 
particular value judgments do not have to be personally made by the 
defendant.169 Additionally, the EOC’s Article 8 introduction to the 
elements of war crimes further specifies that the defendant need not 
make particular legal evaluations regarding the existence and 
characterization of an armed conflict; it instead requires “awareness of 
the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed 
conflict.”170 Given that the existence of an armed conflict is the sine 
qua non of war crimes—no war, no war crime—and that the classic 
crime of aggression is the ultimate act of war—this latter standard is 
an important one because it makes proving the element of knowledge 
of an armed conflict easier. This is particularly so if one, for example, 
is arguing that an initial aggressive attack that triggers an armed 
conflict is actually an act that is taken during an armed conflict. 
Awareness of the fact that the attack is one perpetrated by one’s 
national military forces against property or citizens of another 
sovereign nation should be sufficient to meet such awareness. 
 
164. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 30(1) (“Unless otherwise provided, a 
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements 
are committed with intent and knowledge.”). 
165. Yet, neither the EOC nor the Rome Statute specify which elements are 
material; paragraph seven of the EOC’s general introduction structures 
elements generally as conduct, consequences, and circumstances of the 
crime, but does not state whether these are material or not. See 
generally DORMANN, supra note 163, at 12.  
166. EOC, supra note 121, at p. 1; see also DORMANN, supra note 163, at 11 
(discussing the “unless otherwise provided” provision, concluding that 
different mental states than Article 30’s intent and knowledge may be 
required by treaties and customary international humanitarian law, and 
explicitly referencing ICTY jurisprudence to find that recklessness is an 
allowable mental state for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions). 
167. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 30(2).  
168. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 30(3). 
169. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 30(3) & (4); EOC, supra note 
121, at p.1. 
170. See EOC, supra note 121, at p.13 art. 8. 
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B.  Addressing the Crime of Aggression Through War Crimes: Modes of 
Liability  
The Rome Statute allows for individual criminal responsibility not 
just for the direct physical commission of a particular crime,171 but for 
various levels and types of participation in, or contributions to, an 
offense, including direct and indirect perpetration, as well as aiding-
and-abetting, and accomplice-type liability.172 Given that the distinct 
legal regimes undergirding war crimes (jus in bello) and the crime of 
aggression (jus ad bellum) are directed at different levels of decision-
making (operational and tactical versus strategic), and that those 
responsible for decisions that result in aggressive war will rarely be 
responsible for actions that result in war crimes, the overlap between 
those who engage in war crimes and those guilty of the crime of 
aggression will typically require utilization of modes of liability 
beyond direct perpetration.173  
Hence, the following analysis briefly explores, at a general level, 
an approach to sanctioning the crime of aggression (here, Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait) via prosecution of a war crime. The essential 
mechanism for achieving this outcome requires tying a particular war 
crime to Hussein through both the Rome Statute’s various modes of 
accomplice liability and through the related concept of superior 
responsibility. While this nexus can be made regarding any war crime 
if given the proper facts, the below scenario picks the war crime of 
attacking civilians—the paradigmatic violation of jus in bello’s 
principle of distinction—and assumes that Saddam Hussein’s forces 
have engaged in conduct satisfying the elements of this war crime. 
The below exercise assumes that a particular instance of the war 
crime of attacking civilians was perpetrated by Iraqi troops during the 
invasion of Kuwait, with the invasion concomitantly constituting the 
 
171. Or commission by omission when an individual has a duty and ability to 
act but fails to do so. See CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12, at 161. 
172. As well as for Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 25; see generally 
CASSESE’S ICL, supra note 12 at 175 (outlining various ICL modes of 
liability, and controversially arguing that joint criminal enterprise 
liability (JCE) is “implicitly permitted by Article 25(3)(a)); cf., James 
G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 
25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2012) (describing the impetus behind 
expanded modes of liability as supposedly necessary to “capture the role 
of the principal architects of atrocity,” and noting the difficulty of 
ensuring fair and appropriate individual culpability when someone is 
made criminally responsible for the acts of others). 
173. A national leader is unlikely to personally attack civilians, and it is also 
unlikely that one would be involved in in planning or ordering such an 
attack, or have knowingly facilitated its commission by meeting Article 
25(d)’s requirements, given the typical distinction in decision-making 
levels between warfare and the decision to wage war. 
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manifest act of aggression that could be criminally attributed to 
Hussein. 
Juxtaposing elements of the crime of aggression against that of 
the war crime of attacking civilians, one is struck by the disparate 
levels of the actus reus: 
 
Article 8 bis Crime of 
aggression174 
 
Article 8(2)(b)(i) War 
crime of attacking civilians175 
1. The perpetrator planned, 
prepared, initiated or executed an 
act of aggression 
1. The perpetrator directed 
an attack 
2. The perpetrator was a 
person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of 
the State which committed the 
act of aggression 
2. The object of the attack 
was a civilian population as such 
or individual civilians not taking 
direct part in hostilities 
3. The act of aggression – the 
use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political 
independence of another State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United 
Nations – was committed
3. The perpetrator intended 
the civilian population as such or 
individual civilians not taking 
direct part in hostilities to be the 
object of the attack 
 
4. The perpetrator was aware 
of the factual circumstances that 
established that such a use of 
armed force was inconsistent with 
the Charter of the United 
Nations 
4. The conduct took place in 
the context of and was associated 
with an international armed 
conflict 
5. The act of aggression, by 
its character, gravity and scale, 
constituted a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United 
Nations 
5. The perpetrator was aware 
of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an 
armed conflict 
 
6. The perpetrator was aware 
of the factual circumstances that 
established such a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
 
 
174. See EOC, supra note 121, at p. 43 art. 8bis. 
175. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(b)(i). 
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This elemental comparison highlights the reality that most war 
crimes are committed at the tactical and operational levels of armed 
conflict by those who do not meet element two of the above crime of 
aggression (the leadership requirement).176 For example, the 
preparatory committee (PrepCom) that drafted the ICC criminal 
elements clarified, in the PrepCom’s Article 8(2)(b)(iv)’s travaux 
preparatoires, that “directing an attack” as required by the above war 
crime, “describe(s) the act of the attack itself” whereas “launching an 
attack,” the actus reus of an excessive attack found in Article 
8(2)(b)(iv), “would also include the planning phase.”177 However, the 
commentary to AP I Art. 51(2), the primary legal basis of this 
crime,178 explains that the word “directed” in the Article was meant to 
emphasize the article’s objective:  “[b]y using the words ’directed’ and 
‘as such’ it emphasizes that the population must never be used as a 
target or as a tactical objective.”179 Yet, even with the PrepCom’s 
limited definition of directing, this does not mean that those that 
“merely” planned an attack against civilians, even if at the leadership 
level of the State, versus tactically directing its execution, would be 
immune from prosecution of such an intentional attack—it just makes 
it harder to prove.180 
Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute also provide, given the 
appropriate facts, other modes of liability to hold Hussein-type 
aggressors criminally responsible for their military members’ war 
crime of attacking civilians. For example, if Hussein participated by 
ordering the attacks against civilians, this would satisfy Article 
25(b)(3)’s particular mechanism of criminal responsibility. Yet, 
punishing the ordering of an attack against civilians would not 
sanction Hussein for his crime of aggression; ordering the crime is 
simply a type of criminal participation, one common to many 
domestic systems, and the resultant crime is the actual war crime, not 
 
176. See supra, part I.A.X at X (highlighting jus ad bellum and jus in bello).  
177. DORMANN, supra note 163, at 162. 
178. DORMANN, supra note 163, at 166. 
179. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ¶ 1938 
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Proto
cols.pdf [http://perma.cc/29A9-4A5W] [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY]. 
180. If planning is an acceptable type of participation giving rise to criminal 
responsibility, demonstrating that Hussein helped plan the initial 
invasion of Kuwait, including an alleged war crime, could contribute to 
meeting the material elements of Art.8(2)b)(i) as well as demonstrate 
elements of the crime of aggression, such as the leadership position 
element (through the evidence of what type of control he exercised) and 
type of involvement in the aggressive act, etc. 
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the crime of aggression. Hence, this analysis turns to Article 25(3)(c)’s 
facilitation mode of liability:  aiding and abetting the attacks, 
including by “providing the means for its commission.”181  
To address the crime of aggression through the war crime of 
attacking civilians (or of attacking civilian objects, per Article 
8(2)(b)(ii)), one could argue that the manifest act of aggression itself 
constitutes the provision of the means for the war crime of attacking 
civilians. The act of aggression is the proverbial green light to conduct 
attacks against civilians. This line of argument would allow the 
prosecutor to put on evidence of the crime of aggression, which could 
theoretically be utilized in sentencing.182 However, the prosecution 
would still need to overcome the huge obstacle that is proving the 
requisite intent: that Saddam Hussein, when assisting or providing the 
means for the crime of attacking of civilians (the means or assistance 
being the manifest act of aggression itself) did so with the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of the war crime. While such intent can be 
inferred from the circumstances, war crimes are not typically 
considered a consequence that will occur in the ordinary course of 
events of launching a war.183 Even with Article 25(3)(d)’s common 
purpose mode of liability, the act must be made with the goal of 
furthering the criminal activity or made in the knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime;184 this common criminal 
purpose will be difficult to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, thus 
making the liability link between the war criminals and Hussein a 
significant evidentiary challenge.  
In rare situations, it seems that what might be decisive in such a 
prosecutorial effort would be the extent to which the national leader 
 
181. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 25(3); “(b) Orders, solicits or 
induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or  is 
attempted; (c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a 
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission.” Id. 
182. See Ventura & Gillett, The Fog of War, supra note 11, at 534 
(explaining that a factual finding of a crime of aggression could be 
utilized as an aggravating factor, falling under “abuse of power or 
official capacity,” or used to enhance the gravity of the war crime in 
question). 
183. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. 
FOR THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
VOL. I: RULES, Rule 156 (2005), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB35-CZHC] (stating 
that “[t]he description of “intention” of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court includes the perpetrator being “aware that [the 
consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events”) [hereinafter 
CIL Database]; Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 30(2)(b). 
184. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 25(3)(d)(i) and (ii). 
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signaled to his subordinates his understanding of the illegality of the 
decision to launch the war. Inferring a shared criminal purpose to 
execute the war contrary to fundamental norms of jus in bello would 
be more logical in such a situation, because those responsible for 
operational execution would understand the national leadership’s view 
that compliance with international law was inconsequential.  
Another method of addressing, at least in part, the crime of 
aggression via prosecution of a war crime utilizes Rome Statute 
Article 28’s doctrine of command or superior responsibility. This 
mechanism of attaching individual liability for acts of others imposes 
liability on military commanders or any “person effectively acting as a 
military commander,” making them criminally responsible for crimes 
committed by those “forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control” in certain instances.185 Any 
national leader such as Hussein, if they possessed command and 
control authority over the armed forces, would theoretically be 
criminally responsible for Iraqi armed forces attacking civilians if he:  
knew or should have known they would so criminally attack (in other 
words, that the criminal acts were forseeable), and he “failed to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to 
prevent or repress their commission.”186 But, if Hussein was not acting 
as a military commander—and most national commanders do not—
and instead was serving as a political vice military leader, Article 
28(b)’s tougher standard of mens rea would be applicable, requiring 
that that Hussein actually knew (or consciously disregarded 
information indicating) that; (1) his military was committing war 
crimes; (2), plus that the challenged activities were within his 
“effective authority and control,”; and (3)  and finally that he failed 
to take requisite measures or report the activities for investigation.187 
In establishing that Hussein exercised Article 28’s requisite 
authority and control, the prosecutor might be able to demonstrate 
that he met the leadership requirement of the crime of aggression, as 
well as possibly supporting aggression’s first element: evidence that 
Hussein prepared or planned an act of aggression could be relevant to 
demonstrate the level of authority he wielded over those in the 
military. Furthermore, showing that he engaged in an act of 
aggression via planning, preparing, or initiating the act of aggression 
could suggest that reasonable measures were within his control to 
prevent such crimes. One could argue that if he had the type of 
participatory power required in element one of the crime of 
 
185. Rome Statute supra note 8, at art. 28(a). 
186. Rome Statute supra note 8, at art. 28(a)(i) and (ii). 
187. Rome Statute supra note 8, at art. 28(b). 
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aggression, it is more likely that he possessed the type of control 
requisite to attach superior responsibility liability.188  
If one finds that Hussein functioned as a military-type 
commander, the evidence and argumentation: (1) utilized to establish 
that he had the requisite mens rea of “knew or should have known”189 
that his troops would directly attack civilians; and (2) utilized to 
establish both the nexus to an armed conflict and his “awareness of 
factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed 
conflict” (elements four and five, respectively, of above right-hand 
column), could potentially establish the manifest act of aggression 
element, plus his awareness of the factual circumstances of same 
(element six). Yet finding evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Hussein knew his subordinates would commit a particular 
war crime, such as that of attacking civilians, either by direct 
knowledge or by arguing that such crime would “occur in the ordinary 
course of events” of launching an aggressive war is problematic and 
represents an extremely high prosecutorial hurdle to clear.190 
C.  Crime of Aggression As An Excessive Attack 
1. General Concept 
Similar to the approaches outlined above regarding the war crime 
of directing an attack against civilians, a similar treatment of the 
crime of aggression could be attempted with regard to the war crime 
of disproportionate (excessive) attack against civilians and/or civilian 
objects, the ICC crime found at Article 8(2)(b)(iv).191 Yet, this 
 
188. See Rome Statute supra note 8, at art. 28(a)(ii). However, a national 
level military commander cannot be expected to be aware of everything 
his subordinates are doing, even under the relaxed “should have known” 
standard. See generally Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose is 
Good for the Gander Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United 
States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards Its 
Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 369, 364 (2006-2007) (analyzing the various 
treatments of mens rea associated with command responsibility in post-
World War II cases). 
189. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 28(b)(i). 
190. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 31. This is a high hurdle unless 
there is a situation in which the aggressor clearly makes his knowledge 
of the illegality of the decision to launch the war known to his military 
forces. In such a situation, it arguably becomes more foreseeable that 
military units will disregard international law. 
191. And severe damage to the natural environment. See EOC, supra note 
121, at p. 19 art. 8(2)(b)(iv). As noted above, “launching” is construed 
by the ICC elemental PrepCom to include participation in the planning 
phase of an attack; this type of contribution seems more likely to 
correspond to the possible participatory level of a high-ranking military 
or civilian official who meets Article 8bis’s leadership requirement. 
Hence, the evidence used to demonstrate such participation could 
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method suffers from the same proof issues identified in the above 
discussion: it assumes that the aggressor did actually help plan, order 
or otherwise participate in, a particular unlawful attack with the 
requisite intent; or that he possessed the requisite knowledge that his 
subordinates were going to engage in such a criminal act, knowledge 
necessary to make his facilitation a criminal one, as well as necessary 
to attach liability via superior responsibility—and that evidence exists 
to support such elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond such 
vexing likely proof issues stands a penological challenge: even if an 
aggressor can be found criminally liable for a war crime, and in doing 
so various elements of the crime of aggression are demonstrated and 
survive relevancy challenges because they help prove the war crime, 
the aggressor at sentencing will be punished for the war crime, not for 
the illegal war, unless all the aggression elements are met and 
considered at sentencing. 
So instead of such tangential approaches, this Article proposes a 
differentiated application of the proportionality principle, one that 
finds that a manifest act of aggression can itself constitute the war 
crime of excessive attack committed by the aggressor, without 
constituting either a war crime or crime of aggression for the soldiers 
executing the actual military operations. The vehicle for such a 
nuanced treatment of particular conduct is provided by the war crime 
of “excessive incidental death, injury, or damage,” found at Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) [hereinafter war crime of excessive attack].192 Pursuant to 
this approach, it is the national leader’s act of launching the war of 
aggression that makes discrete attacks on the battlefield excessive.193 
Accordingly, this approach does not rely on an accessorial link to an 
in bello violation by subordinate forces. Instead, the moment those 
forces place civilians or civilian property at risk of incidental injury of 
collateral damage, the national leader is culpable for launching an 
excessive attack. As described, Hussein’s crime of aggression ipso facto 
constitutes an excessive attack. The criminal act of aggression 
transforms the risk of incidental civilian deaths, injury and property 
destruction that are an intrinsic part of war from otherwise 
constituting lawful collateral damage, to that of criminal excess.  
In order to maintain the principle of equal application of jus in 
bello—on pragmatic and teleological grounds, thus preserving its 
 
likewise support crime of aggression elements such as the leadership 
requirement plus, possibly, the overall plan for the manifest act of 
aggression itself. 
192. The Rome Statute restricts this crime to international armed conflicts, 
and does not list it as a war crime for those situations considered non-
international armed conflicts per Article 8(2)(b)(iv). 
193. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 8bis (implying that any attack 
during a war of aggression will be excessive).   
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humanitarian effects on conflict—the separation described in Part I 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello must continue for the vast 
majority of combatants outside those liable for crimes of aggression.194 
Hence, this proposal’s conversion of incidental damage from lawful to 
criminally excessive, occurs only for those who order the aggressive 
war (those who satisfy the elements of the crime of aggression), and 
not for those planning or executing, at the operational and tactical 
levels, the actual attacks that create this inherent risk. The criminal 
liability for an excessive attack under this approach—whose 
excessiveness hinges on jus ad bellum illegality—is only incurred by 
those responsible and accountable for non-compliance with today’s jus 
ad bellum, because it is the latter criminal act that tips the balance 
for its perpetrators from jus in bello legality to battlefield illegality. 
This is a nuanced, contextual approach to finding liability for the war 
crime of excessive attack, as it takes an attack that is otherwise 
lawful—not excessive, in particular—for almost all of those 
participating in a particular attack, and makes its resultant incidental 
damage criminally excessive for those most culpable for the war’s 
unavoidable brutality: the criminal aggressors responsible for 
initiating and sustaining the conflict.  
2. War Crime of Excessive Attack: Background and Elements 
An explication of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is warranted to fully flesh out 
this suggestion. It prohibits: 
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated.195 
The legal foundation for this war crime of excessive attack rests 
on the jus in bello principle known as proportionality, which itself 
reflects an uneasy compromise among the principles of military 
necessity, humanity, and distinction/discrimination.196 The “cardinal 
 
194. See generally Jens D. Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 79, 115 (2013) (highlighting that “IHL norms have 
practicality and enforcement concerns built into them at the ground 
level” because “once participants start rejecting the rules they risk 
sliding towards total war”) [hereinafter Ohlin, Targeting].  
195. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
196. See generally, William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and 
Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 93 (1982) 
(dissecting the principles of military necessity and humanity as they 
relate to proportionality). 
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principle”197 of distinction requires that military forces distinguish 
civilians and their property from combatants and military targets and 
only direct their attacks at the latter.198 The principles of military 
necessity and humanity undergird this concept of civilian protection 
from attack, prohibiting destruction for its own sake and those 
measures unnecessary for victory. Thus, despite immunizing civilians 
from attack, jus in bello recognizes that civilian deaths, injury, and 
property destruction will continue to occur in armed conflict; the law 
“virtually take[s] for granted” civilian injury and damage as a result 
of war, even when attacks are limited to military targets.199  
While recognizing that such “unavoidable” death and destruction 
will occur in an armed conflict, international humanitarian law 
attempts to limit it through the principles of proportionality and 
precautions.200 Whereas the latter directs belligerents to take all 
feasible measures to mitigate the risks to civilians posed by military 
operations, the proportionality principle puts the principle of military 
necessity, in the form of military advantage, on one side of the ledger 
and anticipated civilian deaths, injury and property destruction on 
the other.201 Hence, this rule juxtaposes incidental damage—the 
civilian death and destruction that is collateral to an attack directed 
 
197. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 257 (July 8, 1996).  
198. LTC RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO, JA, USA ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
DESKBOOK 148 (William J. Johnson & Andrew D. Gillman, eds. 2012) 
[hereinafter LOAC DESKBOOK]; see also AP I, supra note 20, at art. 48 
(“Parties…shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”). 
199. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 123; see also AP 
COMMENTARY, supra note 179, at para. 1935 (“There is no doubt that 
armed conflicts entail dangers for the civilian population.”); A.P.V. 
ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 19 (2004) (“It is an unfortunate 
feature of war in populated areas that large numbers of civilians are 
killed.”); Fenrick, supra note 196, at 92 (“In any armed conflict people 
are injured or killed and property is damage or destroyed.”).  
200. FRANCES LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF 
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 15 (Apr. 24, 1863), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110?OpenDocument  
[https://perma.cc/XE5Y-ZLJB] (“Military necessity admits of all direct 
destruction of life or limb of ‘armed’ enemies, and of other persons 
whose destruction is incidentally ‘unavoidable’ in the armed contests of 
the war.”). 
201. See Geoffrey S. Corn, War, Law, and Precautionary Measures: 
Broadening the Perspective of the Vital Risk Mitigation Principle, 42 
PEPP. L. REV. 419, 422-23 (2015) (arguing that precautionary measures 
provide greater protection to the civilian population than the 
proportionality calculus) [hereinafter Corn, Precautionary Measures]. 
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against a legitimate military objective—with the military advantage 
expected from the otherwise lawful attack, and prohibits the attack if 
the former outweighs the latter.202 Such a prohibited attack is one AP 
I considers “indiscriminate.”203 
This principle of customary international law204 is codified in 
Article 51 of AP I which prohibits indiscriminate attacks, including 
attacks205 that are expected to cause “incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.”206 While this rule has been 
widely criticized as vague and complex, due to its balancing act 
between dissimilar considerations, it is also characterized as “the true 
guarantee of robust civilian protection from the effects of attacks in 
wartime.”207 This rule is supremely important because it prohibits 
otherwise lawful attacks against legitimate military objectives because 
of their collateral effects on civilians. Hence, it reduces the amount of 
unavoidable destruction condoned by jus in bello by causing military 
 
202. See generally A.P.V ROGERS, supra note 199, at 17-22 (outlining the 
principle of proportionality, noting that the word itself is absent from 
the principle’s codification in AP I due to the inherent difficulties 
surrounding such a calculus). 
203. AP I, supra note 20, at art. 51(5).  
204. CIL Database, supra note 183, at Rule 14 (citing the proportionality 
principle as articulated by Article 51(5)(b), AP I, as a norm of 
customary international law). 
205. Attacks are defined as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether 
in offence or in defence.” See AP I, supra note 20, at art. 49(1). While 
the EOC elements focus on a disproportionate attack, the principle of 
jus in bello proportionality upon which this crime is based has at times 
been construed to apply to all military operations during an armed 
conflict and not simply attacks. See, e.g. THE TURKEL COMM’N, THE 
PUB. COMM’N TO EXAMINE THE MAR. INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010, Part I, 
paras. 94, 96 (2011), available at http://turkel-
committee.gov.il/files/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5RBP-ZZQN] (applying a proportionality analysis to 
both a naval blockade conducted during an international armed conflict, 
as well as to related sanctions). 
206. AP I, supra note 20, at art. 51(5)(b). AP I Article 57 also includes this 
proportionality calculation, requiring commanders to both refrain from 
launching a disproportionate attack as well as requiring them to call off 
an attack if it becomes apparent that it will be disproportionate.  AP I, 
supra note 20, at art. 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b). 
207. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 130; see generally 
Corn, Precautionary Measures, supra note 201, at 3 (highlighting the 
uncertainty inherent in weighing civilian casualties against military 
gains); see also Fenrick, supra note 196, at 94 (“It is much easier to 
formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than it is to 
apply it to a particular set of circumstances.”). 
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forces to forgo some attacks that are militarily necessary, but too 
impactful on civilians.  
3. The Symmetry with Article 8bis Crime of Aggression 
The Rome Statute, at least regarding international armed 
conflicts, recognizes the critical nature of the principle of 
proportionality by criminalizing its violation in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).208 
The statute adds several modifiers to AP I’s rule: it criminalizes those 
attacks which are “clearly” excessive, an addition that harmonizes the 
regulation of combat with criminal law, finding that: “excessive means 
that the disproportion is not in doubt.”209 The ICC crime also adds 
“overall” to AP I’s “concrete and direct military advantage” against 
which the incidental deaths, injury or damage must be weighed; the 
PrepCom noted that the term is explained in the EOC’s footnote 36, 
which states in relevant part that “[s]uch advantage may or may not 
be temporally or geographically related.”210 The PrepCom also noted 
that several delegations to the drafting of the Rome Statute explained 
that “overall . . . could not refer to long-term political advantages or 
the winning of a war per se.”211 
If the jus in bello rule of proportionality and therefore Art. 
8(2)(b)(iv)’s crime of excessive attack exists because of the desire to 
mitigate the fact that “in any armed conflict people are injured or 
killed and property is damaged or destroyed”212—to lessen the 
incidental harm that occurs to civilians despite military operations 
being limited to military objectives—the ultimate mitigation effort is 
the outlawing of armed conflict all together, or at least those armed 
conflicts inconsistent with jus ad bellum. Hence, the crime of 
aggression, if it results in civilian death, injury, or property damage,213 
theoretically constitutes the ultimate crime of excessive attack, 
because it is this crime of aggression that opens the door for jus in 
bello’s consequent acceptance and limitation of warfare’s 
“unavoidable” incidental damage and death.214 
 
208. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
209. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 131; see generally 
DORMANN, supra note 163 at 169 (noting that the addition of the words 
“clearly” and “overall” was not meant to change extant interpretations). 
210. EOC, supra note 121, at p. 19 n. 36. 
211. DORMANN, supra note 163, at 164. 
212. Fenrick, supra note 196, at 94. 
213. Or “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.” Rome Statute, supra note 8 at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
214. Fenrick, supra note 196, at 94 (describing jus in bello’s protection “of 
the civilian population as such that does not preclude unavoidable 
incidental civilian casualties which may occur during the course of 
lawful attacks against military objectives”). 
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But therein lies the rub: the strict compartmentalization of the 
laws of war into jus ad bellum and jus in bello rejects this natural 
symmetry between the war crime of excessive attack and the crime of 
aggression. As footnote 36 to the elements of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) 
expressly states, the former crime “does not address justifications for 
war or other rules related to jus ad bellum.”215 This caveat echoes that 
found in the official Commentary to Article 51, AP I:  “the distinction 
between ‘jus ad bellum’ and ’jus in bello’ is fundamental and should 
always be respected.”216 This well-established schism between the two 
legal regimes results in, as described in Part I, the equal application of 
jus in bello to all parties to a conflict, regardless of victim versus 
aggressor status.  
Yet, this equivalence, if taken to its absurd extreme, allows the 
criminal aggressor to benefit from his own crime, an injustice 
particularly evident in the rule against excessive attack: despite a 
criminal act of aggression (assumed for this analysis), the aggressor 
can lawfully (through their military forces) kill civilians and destroy 
civilian property, either directly or indirectly, during the ensuing 
conflict as long as such harm is incidental to pursuing a military 
objective whose destruction or neutralization realizes gains 
proportionate to the civilian harms.217 This consequence is clearly not 
what the drafters of the equal application principle had in mind: this 
principle only makes sense when it accrues to the benefit of 
subordinate operational military forces, as they should not be 
accountable for the illegal decision of the national leader to launch an 
aggressive war so long as they comply with jus in bello in execution. 
It also makes sense when used to guard against loosening jus in bello 
restrictions based on a lawful jus ad bellum cause; such a loosening 
would degrade achievement of jus in bello’s humanitarian ends. Yet it 
clearly does not make sense when applied to jus ad bellum violators. 
To right this warped view of the equal application principle, a 
view not in keeping with the principle’s pragmatic or teleological 
roots, the military advantage component of excessive attack should be 
read more contextually for national leaders responsible for wars of 
aggression. This can be accomplished through the concept of 
anticipated military advantage—the expected military gain that must 
be weighed against expected civilian losses when considering whether 
an attack is criminally excessive. The “military” modifier of 
 
215. EOC, supra note 121, at p. 19 n. 36 (further providing that “[i]t reflects 
the proportionality requirement inherent in determining the legality of 
any military activity inherent in the context of an armed conflict”). 
216. AP COMMENTARY, supra note 179, at para. 1928. 
217. See Greenwood, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining how the jus in bello / 
jus ad bellum distinction condones violations of the general principle “ex 
injuria non oritur ius”). 
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advantage has typically been understood to keep the gains within the 
jus in bello realm, one that does not include political gains;218 this is a 
narrow interpretation reflecting a transparent but definite legal buffer 
between the battlefield and the government meeting rooms where the 
crime of aggression is hatched. 
But this buffer may be permeable in one respect, specifically for 
those responsible for the crime of aggression: the exact outer contours 
of what constitutes a military advantage are not wholly settled in the 
law. The latest U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Law of War 
Manual emphasizes that the “military advantage offered by the attack 
need not be immediate, but may be assessed in the full context of the 
war strategy.”219 It repeats the identical sentence a few lines later, 
highlighting that military advantage refers to that resulting “from an 
attack when considered as a whole, and not only from its isolated or 
particular parts…[s]imilarly, ‘military advantage’ is not restricted to 
immediate tactical gains, but may be assessed in the full context of 
the war strategy.”220  
So can such “war strategy” include the manifest act of aggression 
that lies at the center of the crime of aggression? That is, if an attack 
will provide gains relative to a war strategy, will an attack that 
provides gains to a war strategy integral to the crime of aggression 
therefore produce zero anticipated military advantage? This approach 
argues that such gains are rendered a priori disadvantageous by their 
direct connection to the crime of aggression. The DOD Law of War 
Manual cites its own previous report to Congress on the Persian Gulf 
War as support for its arguably expansive interpretation of military 
advantage: “‘[m]ilitary advantage’ is not restricted to tactical gains, 
but is linked to the full context of a war strategy, in this instance, the 
execution of the Coalition war plan for liberation of Kuwait” 
(emphasis added).221 If the particular overall war plan is one designed 
to execute a criminal war of aggression, the DOD’s interpretation of 
military advantage would result in the resultant incidental harm to 
 
218. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 93. The concept of 
military advantage is also found in AP I, Art. 52 as a component of the 
definition of military objective; the definition of military objectives 
operationalizes the principle of military necessity. Military objectives 
include: “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances rules 
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” AP I, supra note 20, 
at art. 52(2). 
219. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 47, at p. 
211 para. 5.7.7.2. 
220. Id.  
221. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 47, at p. 
212 n. 170. 
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civilians being excessive, because the military advantage, when viewed 
so expansively—with regard to those liable for the crime of aggression 
only—is zero, as the military advantage for the aggressor of a 
particular, discrete attack that occurs during the manifest act of 
aggression arguably derives its value from jus ad bellum. The 
criminality of the strategy devalues the military advantage to zero. In 
other words, there can be no military advantages for the aggressor 
due to the crime of aggression’s taint: this represents a small but 
finite area of merger between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.222 
While the ICC’s addition of the word “overall” in Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) could imply that the ICC should expansively interpret the 
crime’s military advantage component, an EOC footnote pushes 
against this interpretation, explaining that this adjective is meant to 
clarify that the military advantage does not need to be temporally or 
geographically close in time to the attack.223 Yet, there is some case 
law supporting a very broad interpretation of military advantage, an 
interpretation that makes sense when applied to perpetrators of the 
crime of aggression. For example, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission found that “military advantage must be considered in in 
the context of its relation to the armed conflict as a whole at the time 
of the attack” and “to the military operations between the Parties 
taken as a whole.”224 Yet, this has been called a “gross exaggeration” 
by at least one learned commentator.225  
However, even the EOC commentary concludes in this regard 
that, “the military value of an object may be determined by taking 
into account the broader purpose of a particular military operation 
that may consist of various individual actions.”226 Nesting the crime of 
aggression into this “broader purpose” would invalidate the military 
value of that target, because of its characterization as part of a 
 
222. This approach does not endorse the elimination of the doctrine of double 
effects upon which the principle of proportionality is based. See 
generally Ohlin, Targeting, supra note 194, at 92 (describing how, 
through the dolus eventualis mental state, international criminal 
tribunals such as the ICTY have begun to conflate incidental harms 
that are known but not intended with those harms actually intended, 
thus eliminating the concept of proportional, and hence legal, incidental 
collateral harms). Instead, this approach allows that such incidental 
harms are not intended, and argues that they are excessive due to the 
devaluing of military advantage by the illegal taint of aggressive 
criminality for the national leader as aggressor, and not excessive simply 
because they were known although not intended. 
223. DORMANN, supra note 163, at 163-64. 
224. DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 19, at 95, citing the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission, Partial Award, (2005), 45 ILM 296 at 418.   
225. Id. 
226. DORMANN, supra note 163, at 173. 
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criminal enterprise; the broader purpose is a criminal one, thus the 
military advantage is zero. 
In an admitted stretch, the Martens Clause, as demonstrated by 
the ICTY in the Kupreskic judgment, could be used to support this 
understanding of military advantage.227 In that case, the Tribunal 
found that references to the Martens Clause228 are relevant when a jus 
in bello rule “is not sufficiently rigorous or precise;” in such instances 
the clause’s “principles of humanity” and “dictates of public 
conscience” should help define the rule.229 The Tribunal used such 
principles to apparently conclude that repeated attacks which caused 
incidental damage that individually were not excessive may be 
collectively excessive per the “demands of humanity” and therefore 
possibly constitutive of a criminally excessive attack.230 In a similar 
manner, while individual attacks pursued as part of a manifest act of 
aggression may individually be proportionate for those executing the 
military operation, the principles of humanity and dictates of public 
conscience support an expansive interpretation of military advantage 
for those ordering the manifest act of aggression of which the 
individual attacks are an integral part, thus making those attacks 
excessive exclusively for high-level actors. 
4. Application 
A brief application of the above approach to this war crime’s 
elements is found in below table:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
227. See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kurpreskic, Case No. IT-950150T, Judgment, 
¶¶ 522-26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), 
https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/case-study/icty-kurpreskic-case-
study.htm [http://perma.cc/49ZA-NWCF].  
228. The original Martens clause in Hague II as well as its successor 
provision in Hague IV used similar language:  “[u]ntil a more complete 
code of the laws of war is issued, the . . . Parties think it right to 
declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of 
the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and 
the requirements of the public conscience . . . .” See Hague Convention 
(II), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 50, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 403 [hereinafter Hague II]. 
229. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kurpreskic, Case No. IT-950150T, at ¶¶ 522-26.  
230. Id. 
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Article 8 bis Crime of 
aggression231 
 
Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) War 
crime of excessive incidental 
death, injury, or damage232  
1. The perpetrator planned, 
prepared, initiated or executed an 
act of aggression 
1. The perpetrator launched 
an attack 
2. The perpetrator was a 
person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of 
the State which committed the 
act of aggression 
2. The attack was such that 
it would cause incidental death or 
injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects or widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment and that 
such death, injury or damage 
would be of such an extent as to 
be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated 
3. The act of aggression – the 
use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political 
independence of another State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United 
Nations – was committed 
3. The perpetrator knew that 
the attack would cause incidental 
death or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural 
environment and that such death, 
injury or damage would be of 
such an extent as to be clearly 
excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated 
4. The perpetrator was aware 
of the factual circumstances that 
established that such a use of 
armed force was inconsistent with 
the Charter of the United 
Nations 
4. The conduct took place in 
the context of and was associated 
with an international armed 
conflict 
5. The act of aggression, by 
its character, gravity and scale, 
constituted a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United 
Nations 
5. The perpetrator was aware 
of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an 
armed conflict233 
 
6. The perpetrator was aware 
 
231. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8bis(1).   
232. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8bis(2)(b)(iv). 
233. See EOC, supra note 121, at p. 43 art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
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of the factual circumstances that 
established such a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.234 
 
To recap, this exercise assumes the following: (1) that a criminal 
act of aggression has been committed by a particular individual; (2) 
that the predicate manifest act of aggression included the act of 
ordering an invasion of a neighboring country; and (3) that at the 
time the invasion was ordered, it was reasonably foreseeable that 
attacks by the invading forces would produce incidental civilian death 
and property loss in the ordinary course of the invasion. The 
incidental damage that was expected to occur in the ordinary course 
of events of the illegal invasion fulfills elements two and three of the 
crime of excessive attack; the “excessive” sub-element is automatically 
met by virtue of the criminal invasion which acted to de-value the 
anticipated military gain. Element one, the actus reus, is met by the 
order to invade, per Article 25(3)(b)’s mode of liability. Elements four 
and five are met by the same facts demonstrating the manifest act of 
aggression assumed above.   
 
Conclusion 
The above approach locates a small point of merger between jus 
ad bellum and the jus in bello principle of proportionality that 
undergirds the ICC war crime of excessive attack in order to punish 
those guilty of the supreme crime. Some may argue that this 
expansive method constitutes a normative endeavor to change the lex 
lata. One could push back against this charge by pointing to the fact 
that the ICC elements of crime are interpretative aids, and that the 
outer reaches of the concept of military advantage have no settled 
boundaries within international law. However, most experts’ 
understanding of the crime of excessive attack, or at least the 
customary international law of proportionality which forms its 
foundation, is one which does not include reference to jus ad bellum 
norms. 
Yet, it seems eminently reasonable to argue that the manifest, 
conspicuous illegality of the crime of aggression taints the military 
advantage component of the war crime of excessive attack, devaluing 
it to such an extent that any foreseeable civilian casualties anticipated 
from the attack are to be considered clearly excessive, but only for the 
individuals who have committed the crime of aggression. This 
reasoning is arguably consistent with the principle of legality because 
 
234. EOC, supra note 121, at p. 43 art. 8bis. 
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the manifest act of aggression makes the initial knowledge of 
incidental civilian losses one no reasonable national leader would 
deem necessary, thus one that does not confer the requisite military 
advantage needed to offset such losses. Such an approach is “fully 
consistent with common sense and with the abiding purposes of the 
laws of nations.”235 Yet, Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute provides 
that “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition [of a crime] shall be 
interpreted in favour [sic] of the person being investigated, prosecuted 
or convicted;” whether this above approach appropriately signals to 
potential aggressors the illegality of their acts is debatable.236  
In conclusion, it is truly puzzling how national leaders responsible 
for an aggressive war have been able to reap such a windfall from the 
ad bellum/in bello division with little protest for so long. This 
division, which results in the equal application of the jus in bello on 
both sides of a conflict, is truly only logical when the benefits accrue 
to the operational forces on the field:  the ones charged with executing 
war under jus in bello restraints. Why should the benefits of adhering 
to jus in bello run back up from the battlefield to those operating in a 
jus ad bellum world? Such an inverse, and perverse, application 
provides no incentive for jus in bello compliance because the national 
leaders responsible for aggressive war are typically not the individuals 
making the jus in bello decisions. Instead, this schism simply 
immunizes the jus ad bellum aggressor from criminal accountability 
for no reason, allowing the lawful execution of operations by 
subordinates to nullify the fact that any attack in an aggressive war 
that results in civilian death or property destruction is truly a 
criminally indiscriminate one for those ordering a war of aggression. 
Such attacks are indiscriminate in that they violate the 
proportionality principle for the leader who ordered the illegal attack; 
the attacks possess a different value for national leaders than for 
battlefield actors because there was never a legitimate necessity to 
offset the risk of civilian harm for the national level aggressors. 
Finally, criminally sanctioning aggressive war as a war crime is 
not a new suggestion: the charges against Thomas Marle, King 
Charles I, Napoleon, and those against King George in the American 
Declaration of Independence all demonstrate early criminal conflation 
of the two governing legal regimes.237 While international law has 
 
235. ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 134 (2009) 
(attributing this quote to Sir Shawcross during the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal). 
236. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 22(2). 
237. See generally Ziv Bohrer, International Criminal Law’s Millennium of 
Forgotten History, forthcoming Law and History Review, (on file with 
author and cited with permission) (persuasively demonstrating that such 
trials are exemplars of the use of war crimes to prosecute what may be 
considered early crimes of aggression). 
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evolved greatly since such early criminal accountings, it has not 
matured enough. This Article’s inquiry is made out of necessity, given 
the failure of the international community since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo to hold criminally accountable those who engage in aggressive 
war. The author hopes these ruminations may in some small measure 
help move the gears of justice in the direction of filling this void. 
  
